GR 130831; (February, 1998) (Digest)
G.R. No. 130831 February 10, 1998
ROBERTO D. RAMAS, FRANCISCO N. ORAIZ, JR., BENERANDO F. MIRANDA, GEORGE V. BATERNA, TOMAS R. LACIERDA, SR., and PEDRO T. CALIMOT, JR., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RAUL F. FAMOR, PONCIANO P. CAJETA, MERLYN U. RABE, CRESENCIA C. BOISER, EDGAR S. REVELO, and JULIETO B. MABASCOG, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners and private respondents were candidates for municipal positions in Guipos, Zamboanga del Sur in the May 8, 1995 elections. Petitioners were proclaimed winners by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. Private respondents, the losing candidates, filed separate election protests with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pagadian City, which were consolidated. On May 16, 1996, the RTC rendered a decision declaring private respondents (except Mabascog) and petitioner Miranda as the winners. On May 22, 1996, private respondents filed a Motion for Immediate Execution of Decision Pending Appeal, citing Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, Supreme Court rulings, the dilatory nature of the appeal, public interest, and the near expiration of the term of office. They offered to post a bond. Petitioners filed an Opposition and their Notices of Appeal on May 28, 1996. On May 29, 1996, the RTC granted the motion for execution pending appeal, citing public interest, the near expiration of the term, and the one-year pendency of the protest. A writ of execution was issued. Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the COMELEC (SPR No. 14-96) to annul the RTC order. The COMELEC issued a temporary restraining order. On September 23, 1997, the COMELEC promulgated a Resolution denying the petition, upholding the RTC’s order, citing public interest, the pendency of the protest for over a year, and the need to prevent the “grab-the-proclamation-prolong-the-protest” technique. It referenced the Dictado and Aragdon doctrines, stating that a protestant adjudged winner by the trial court becomes a presumptive winner during the pendency of the appeal. Petitioners filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the RTC’s order granting execution pending appeal based on the grounds of public interest, near expiration of the term, and the one-year pendency of the election protest.
RULING
The Supreme Court granted the petition, annulled the COMELEC Resolution dated September 23, 1997, and set aside the RTC Order dated May 29, 1996, granting execution pending appeal. The Court held that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. The RTC’s cited reasons—”public interest,” “near expiration of the term of office,” and “pendency of the protest for one year”—were insufficient and did not constitute “good reasons” as required by Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court for discretionary execution. The phrase “good reasons” must be based on circumstances beyond the bare fact of the election contest’s pendency or the shortness of the term remaining. The RTC’s order was a mere statement of conclusions without stating factual premises. The COMELEC’s reliance on the Dictado and Aragdon doctrines was misplaced, as these doctrines pertain to the right to assume office based on a proclamation by the board of canvassers, not to execution pending appeal of a judicial decision. The COMELEC’s reference to Garcia vs. De Jesus was inapplicable, as the “good reasons” in that case were specific and substantiated, unlike the general and unsubstantiated reasons in this case. The COMELEC’s affirmation of the RTC’s order, despite the absence of specific, compelling reasons justifying immediate execution, constituted a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
