GR 130140; (October, 1999) (Digest)
G.R. No. 130140 . October 25, 1999.
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS represented by MAGTANGGOL C. GUNIGUNDO, PCGG Chairman and ORLANDO C. SALVADOR, as Consultant, Technical Working Group of the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, petitioners, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO as Ombudsman; JOSE Z. OSIAS; PACIFICO E. MARCOS; EDUARDO V. ROMUALDEZ; FERNANDO C. ORDOVEZA; and JUANITO ORDOVEZA, Members of the Board of Directors of Philippine Seeds, Inc.; CONCERNED MEMBERS OF THE DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS
On October 8, 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (COMMITTEE). Its functions included inventorying behest loans, identifying lenders and borrowers, and recommending actions for recovery. On November 9, 1992, Memorandum Order No. 61 provided criteria for determining a behest loan. In its Fourteenth Report dated July 15, 1993, the COMMITTEE reported that Philippine Seeds, Inc. (PSI) was one of the corporations that obtained behest loans. President Ramos directed the COMMITTEE to proceed with administrative and judicial actions. On March 2, 1996, the COMMITTEE filed a sworn complaint with the Ombudsman (docketed as OMB-0-96-0968) against the Directors of PSI and the concerned Directors of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The complaint alleged that PSI obtained loans/guarantees from DBP that were undercollateralized, that its principal stockholders and officers were relatives of the late President Marcos, and that foreclosure was not implemented due to marginal notes from President Marcos. In a resolution dated May 14, 1996, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint, holding that the offenses had already prescribed. The Ombudsman applied Act No. 3326 , as amended, and ruled that the prescriptive period for violations of R.A. No. 3019 is fifteen years, which began to run from the day of the commission of the violation. Since the last loan was approved in 1978 and the complaint was filed only in 1996, more than fifteen years had elapsed. The COMMITTEE filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the prescriptive period should be computed from the discovery of the offense in 1992. The Ombudsman denied the motion in an order dated February 10, 1997, reiterating that prescription commenced from the day of the commission of the crime. The COMMITTEE then filed the instant petition for certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the offenses with which the respondents were charged had already prescribed.
RULING
No, the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court ruled that the applicable law on prescription of offenses punishable under special laws, such as R.A. No. 3019 , is Act No. 3326 , as amended. Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The Court held that the prescriptive period for violations of R.A. No. 3019 is fifteen years. The Court further ruled that the phrase “if the same be not known at the time” refers to the time of the commission of the offense, not to the time of the discovery of the identity of the offender. The offense is “known” when the unlawful act constituting the offense is discovered, even if the identity of the offender is unknown. In this case, the loans were approved and released from 1969 to 1978. The acts constituting the alleged violations were known to the government, as the lender DBP, a government entity, was a party to the transactions. Therefore, prescription commenced from the day of the commission of the offenses, not from their discovery in 1992. Since the complaint was filed only in 1996, more than fifteen years had elapsed from the last alleged act in 1978. The Ombudsman correctly applied the law. The petition was dismissed.