G.R. No. 130140 . October 25, 1999.
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS represented by MAGTANGGOL C. GUNIGUNDO, PCGG Chairman and ORLANDO C. SALVADOR, as Consultant, Technical Working Group of the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, petitioners, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO as Ombudsman; JOSE Z. OSIAS; PACIFICO E. MARCOS; EDUARDO V. ROMUALDEZ; FERNANDO C. ORDOVEZA; and JUANITO ORDOVEZA, Members of the Board of Directors of Philippine Seeds, Inc.; CONCERNED MEMBERS OF THE DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS

On October 8, 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans to inventory behest loans and identify those involved. On November 9, 1992, Memorandum Order No. 61 directed the Committee to include all non-performing loans and provided specific criteria for determining a behest loan. The investigation found that Philippine Seeds, Inc. (PSI) was among the corporations that obtained behest loans. The Committee subsequently filed a sworn complaint with the Ombudsman on March 2, 1996, against PSI’s Directors and the Directors of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) who approved the loans, for alleged violations of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The questioned loan transactions occurred in 1969, 1975, and 1978. The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint, ruling that the offenses had prescribed under the 10-year prescriptive period in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 .

ISSUE

Whether the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint on the ground of prescription, and whether the prescriptive period should be reckoned from the discovery of the offense rather than from the day of its commission.

RULING

Justice Melo, in his concurring and dissenting opinion, agreed with the ponencia’s interpretation that the constitutional provision on imprescriptibility (Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution ) applies only to civil actions for recovery of unlawfully acquired properties, not to criminal actions. However, he dissented from the conclusion to remand the case to the Ombudsman to reopen proceedings. He argued that the offenses had already prescribed. Applying Section 2 of Act No. 3326 , the general rule is that prescription runs from the day of the commission of the violation. The exception—that prescription runs from discovery—applies only when the commission of the violation was not known at the time. Justice Melo concluded that the loan transactions were not clandestine; they were public, documented, and accessible, involving multiple government officials in their approval process. Therefore, the State knew or should have known of the acts constituting the violation at the time they were committed. The prescriptive period began from the dates of the transactions (1969, 1975, 1978), and the filing of the complaint in 1996 was beyond the 10-year period. He also noted that the criteria for behest loans in Memorandum Order No. 61 (1992), if applied retroactively to pre-1992 transactions, could constitute an ex post facto law. Consequently, he voted to dismiss the petition.