G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998
TERESITA G. FABIAN, petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Teresita G. Fabian, president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation, filed an administrative complaint on July 24, 1995, against private respondent Nestor V. Agustin, then District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED), Department of Public Works and Highways. The complaint alleged that Agustin, taking advantage of his official position, inveigled Fabian into an amorous relationship, gifted PROMAT with public works contracts, and interceded for it in his office. When Fabian attempted to terminate the relationship, Agustin allegedly employed acts of harassment, intimidation, and threats. The charges were for oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral conduct under Section 19 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree).
On January 31, 1996, a Graft Investigator found Agustin guilty of grave misconduct and ordered his dismissal. The Ombudsman, in an Order dated February 26, 1996, modified this to a finding of misconduct and a penalty of one-year suspension without pay. After Agustin moved for reconsideration, the Ombudsman inhibited himself, and the case was transferred to Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero. In a Joint Order dated June 18, 1997, Guerrero set aside the Ombudsman’s order and exonerated Agustin.
Fabian appealed to the Supreme Court via certiorari under Rule 45, citing Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 , which allows appeals from Ombudsman decisions in administrative disciplinary cases to the Supreme Court. However, she noted that Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman) states that when a respondent is absolved, the decision is final and unappealable. Due to this conflict, she alternatively sought recourse under Rule 65. Respondents argued that the Ombudsman is constitutionally and statutorily empowered to promulgate its own rules of procedure.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 , which provides for appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases to the Supreme Court via Rule 45, is valid and controlling, or whether the Ombudsman’s rule (Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07) making absolutory decisions final and unappealable can restrict this right of appeal.

RULING

The Supreme Court declared Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 unconstitutional. The Court held that the provision, which provides for appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases directly to the Supreme Court via Rule 45, violates the constitutional proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that “No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and consent.” The Court found that the provision expanded the Court’s appellate jurisdiction without its prior advice and consent.
The Court further ruled that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. This aligns with the appellate procedure for decisions of quasi-judicial agencies and avoids the anomaly where decisions of the Civil Service Commission (appealable to the Court of Appeals) and the Ombudsman (purportedly appealable to the Supreme Court) in similar administrative cases would be reviewed by different courts. The Court emphasized the need for systematic and efficient case management.
Consequently, the Court set aside the Joint Order of the Office of the Ombudsman dated June 18, 1997, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition pursuant to Rule 43. The Court refrained from ruling on the propriety of using Rule 45 versus Rule 65, as the resolution of the constitutional issue rendered such discussion unnecessary.