G.R. No. 129120 . July 2, 1999.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondent Arturo F. Pacificador and six others were charged with multiple murder and frustrated murder for an ambush in Antique in 1989. Pacificador fled and remained at large for nine years while his co-accused were separately tried, convicted, and sentenced, with the trial court finding conspiracy among them. Upon his surrender in 1995, Pacificador filed a petition for bail before Judge Nery G. Duremdes, which was granted. The prosecution moved for reconsideration and sought Judge Duremdes’s inhibition, alleging his order granting bail displayed prejudgment and bias by describing the evidence against Pacificador as “shrouded with ambiguity” and “nebulous.” The trial court denied both motions. The prosecution then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying the motion to inhibit Judge Duremdes despite allegations of manifest bias and prejudgment.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and upheld the Court of Appeals. The legal logic is anchored on the principle that bias and prejudice cannot be lightly presumed. For a judge to be disqualified under Rule 137, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, there must be clear and convincing evidence of partiality, not mere suspicion or bare allegations. The Court emphasized that a judge’s assessment of evidence for bail purposes—a preliminary determination of whether guilt is not strong—does not equate to prejudgment of the main case. The statements in the bail order, which the prosecution cited as proof of bias, were viewed as part of the judge’s judicial function to evaluate the strength of the prosecution’s evidence at that stage. The Court found no clear evidence that Judge Duremdes had a personal bias or had departed from his sacred duty to administer justice impartially. Furthermore, the Court addressed a procedural issue, ruling that the 26-day delay in filing the certiorari petition with the Court of Appeals was not unreasonable under the circumstances and in the higher interest of justice, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence that allows flexibility to prevent a miscarriage of justice. The denial of the inhibition motion was therefore proper.