GR 129099; (July, 2006) (Digest)
G.R. No. 129099 ; July 20, 2006
MA. CHONA M. DIMAYUGA, FELIPE T. AGUINALDO, AND NOEL C. INUMERABLE, petitioners, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, respondent.
FACTS
Petitioners, former employees of the Traffic Regulatory Board (TRB), sought to enjoin the Office of the Ombudsman from proceeding with a preliminary investigation in OMB 0-95-0430 for alleged violations of the Anti-Graft Law. The charges stemmed from a 1994 Special Audit Office (SAO) report of the Commission on Audit (COA), which uncovered irregularities in TRB transactions from 1989 to 1992. Petitioners had filed an appeal with the COA Commission Proper, which remained pending resolution.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Suspension of Preliminary Investigation, arguing the investigation was premature since their administrative appeal on the SAO findings was still unresolved. They cited the case of COA v. Gabor, where the Ombudsman allegedly dismissed a complaint under similar circumstances. The Ombudsman denied their motion and subsequent pleas, prompting this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in proceeding with the preliminary investigation despite the pendency of petitioners’ administrative appeal before the COA.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Court emphasized the constitutional and statutory grant of plenary investigatory and prosecutorial powers to the Ombudsman under Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 . This power is primary and paramount, allowing the Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission of a public official that appears illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
The pendency of an administrative appeal before the COA does not render the Ombudsman’s parallel criminal investigation premature. The Court clarified that a COA audit addresses the administrative accountability of a government official regarding the regularity of disbursements. In contrast, an Ombudsman investigation determines whether there is probable cause to prosecute a crime, such as a graft violation. These are separate proceedings with distinct purposes; a COA finding of administrative regularity does not foreclose criminal liability. The Ombudsman’s discretion to proceed, irrespective of a pending COA appeal, is a valid exercise of its independent constitutional mandate.
Furthermore, the Court found no violation of equal protection. The Ombudsman’s discretionary power includes the latitude to treat cases differently based on its assessment of investigative necessities. The alleged dissimilar treatment in COA v. Gabor did not, by itself, constitute grave abuse of discretion absent a showing of arbitrariness. The temporary restraining order was lifted, allowing the Ombudsman to proceed.
