G.R. No. 128966 , August 18, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDWIN DE VERA y GARCIA, RODERICK GARCIA y GALAMGAM, KENNETH FLORENDO and ELMER CASTRO, accused, EDWIN DE VERA y GARCIA, appellant.

FACTS

This case involves a criminal conviction where appellant Edwin De Vera was found guilty by the ponencia (main decision) as an accomplice to the crime. The ponencia established that De Vera, knowing his co-accused Kenneth Florendo intended to kill the victim and that his three co-accused were armed, acted as a lookout to watch for passersby during the commission of the crime. The ponencia concluded he was not an innocent spectator but was present at the crime scene to aid and abet the offense.

ISSUE

Whether appellant Edwin De Vera should be held liable as a conspirator (and thus a principal) rather than merely as an accomplice for his participation in the crime.

RULING

In his Separate Opinion, Justice Vitug respectfully dissented from the ponencia’s conclusion that De Vera was guilty only as an accomplice. He argued that De Vera’s liability should be that of a conspirator and principal.
Justice Vitug defined conspiracy under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code as occurring when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to carry it out. Once the crime is perpetrated, conspirators bear collective responsibility, making them equally liable as principals, with the act of one considered the act of all.
He differentiated an accomplice under Article 18 as one who collaborates by previous or simultaneous acts but is not a principal as defined in Article 17 (i.e., one who takes a direct part, induces others, or performs an indispensable act).
Applying these definitions, Justice Vitug found no material difference between “to decide” (for conspiracy) and “to concur” or “to assent” (which might imply accomplice liability). He posited that if an individual concurs or assents to a criminal plan prior to its execution and then actually participates, regardless of the degree, that individual should be deemed a conspirator. He would limit accomplice liability to one who, knowing of the criminal design but neither concurring nor assenting to it, cooperates in its execution without taking a direct or indispensable part.
Since De Vera was aware of the plan to kill and agreed to be the lookout, which role he performed during the crime as planned, Justice Vitug concluded that De Vera rendered himself equally liable as a conspirator and principal, just like his co-accused.