G.R. No. 128095 . January 19, 2001.
MANUEL HUANG CHUA and NELSON (NESTOR) DAGANON GO, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Manuel Huang Chua, an employee, and Nelson Go, a contractor/buyer, were charged with Attempted Qualified Theft and Attempted Theft, respectively. The charges stemmed from an incident on October 16, 1989, where a truck owned by Go, purportedly carrying only scrap materials from Clothman Knitting Corporation, was intercepted while attempting to leave the company compound. An inspection revealed it contained finished fabrics and yarn valued at P105,000. The prosecution’s case relied on the testimony of company manager Nixon Uy Lee, who stated that Go implicated Chua and another employee when confronted. A gate pass for the items, signed by Chua, was also presented.
The Regional Trial Court convicted both petitioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, modifying the penalties. The appellate court found that the overt act of loading the finished products onto the truck, coupled with the signed gate pass, constituted attempted theft. It held that the discovery and interception of the truck at the gate prevented the consummation of the crime.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conviction of the petitioners for attempted theft based on the evidence presented.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court reversed the convictions and acquitted the petitioners. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence did not sufficiently establish the felonious intent to gain (animus lucrandi) essential for theft. The mere presence of the finished goods in the truck, absent clear proof of unlawful taking, was insufficient. The gate pass, while signed by Chua, was a regular company document for releasing materials and did not, by itself, prove a conspiracy to steal.
Crucially, the testimony of Nixon Uy Lee regarding Go’s alleged extrajudicial confession implicating Chua was inadmissible hearsay, as Chua was not present to confront or cross-examine the declarant (Go). Furthermore, alleged admissions made by the petitioners to a police officer were inadmissible for being obtained without the proper Miranda warnings. The prosecution’s case, built on these infirm pieces of evidence, was inherently weak. Conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence, not on the weakness of the defense. The Court found that the prosecution did not overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.