G.R. No. 128061 September 3, 1998
JESUS G. SANTOS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BULACAN, BRANCH 9 and OMAR H. YAPCHIONGCO, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Jesus G. Santos, together with four other Santoses, was sued for damages by respondent Omar H. Yapchiongco on May 23, 1979, concerning five parcels of land and a piggery farm subject to an agreement to buy and sell. The trial court dismissed the complaint on June 20, 1991. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision on June 6, 1995, holding petitioner liable for damages. The appellate court’s decision was sent by registered mail to petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Anacleto S. Magno, on June 15, 1995, with notices sent on June 15, 19, and 21, 1995. The mail remained unclaimed and was returned. It was sent again on July 27, 1995, with the same result. On September 27, 1995, petitioner’s counsel informed the court of a change of his law firm’s name and address. The decision was sent again to the new address on March 28, 1996, and was actually received on April 3, 1996. Counsel withdrew his appearance on April 17, 1996. New counsel, Atty. Lemuel M. Santos, entered his appearance on April 18, 1996, and filed a motion for reconsideration. Respondent Yapchiongco opposed, arguing the period for filing had lapsed, contending service was complete five days from June 15, 1995. The Court of Appeals denied the motion on November 29, 1996, ruling that service was deemed complete on June 20, 1995. Petitioner’s subsequent motion for leave to admit his motion for reconsideration was denied on January 30, 1997, as a prohibited second motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE

Did the Court of Appeals commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motions for reconsideration based on its finding that service of its decision was complete on June 20, 1995, thereby making the motion for reconsideration filed on April 18, 1996, out of time?

RULING

Yes, the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion. Under Section 8, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee. However, if the addressee fails to claim the mail from the post office within five days from the date of the first notice of the postmaster, service takes effect at the expiration of such time. For constructive service (the five-day rule) to apply, there must be conclusive proof that the addressee or someone on his behalf was duly notified or actually received the notice. The certification from the postmaster, procured only during the pendency of the petition and stating that notices were “issued” on specific dates, was insufficient. Following Hernandez v. Navarro, such a certification must include data on how, when, and to whom the delivery of the notices was made. The mere notation “Unclaimed: Return to Sender” and the dates of issuance, without proof of receipt of the notices, do not constitute conclusive proof to trigger the constructive service rule. Therefore, in the absence of such proof, the period for filing a motion for reconsideration did not begin to run from the constructive date (June 20, 1995) but from the date of actual receipt (April 3, 1996), making the motion filed on April 18, 1996, timely. The resolutions dated November 29, 1996, and January 30, 1997, were set aside, and the Court of Appeals was directed to act on the motion for reconsideration on the merits.