GR 128053; (June, 2004) (Digest)
G.R. No. 128053 ; June 10, 2004
SPOUSES PRUDENCIO ROBLES AND SUSANA DE ROBLES, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SECOND LAGUNA DEVELOPMENT BANK AND SPOUSES NILO DE ROBLES AND ZENAIDA DE ROBLES, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners obtained a loan from respondent Laguna Development Bank, secured by a real estate mortgage. Due to non-payment, the property was foreclosed and sold at public auction to the bank on May 15, 1984. The certificate of sale was registered on May 31, 1984. The one-year redemption period expired on May 31, 1985, without petitioners exercising their right. Consequently, a new title was issued to the bank in June 1985. The bank later sold the property to respondent spouses in November 1990.
In December 1990, over six years after the foreclosure sale, petitioners offered to redeem the property, but the bank refused as it had already been sold. Petitioners then filed a case for annulment of the certificate of sale and reconveyance. They alleged the foreclosure was void due to lack of proper notice and publication and pleaded for a liberal application of redemption rules on equitable grounds.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioners can still redeem the foreclosed property after the expiration of the statutory redemption period.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, upholding the validity of the foreclosure sale and denying the petitioners’ right to redeem. The Court found the foreclosure proceedings regular, as the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale carried the presumption of regularity regarding the posting and publication of the notice of sale, which petitioners failed to rebut.
Critically, the Court emphasized the distinction between redemption and repurchase. Redemption is a right conferred by law that must be exercised within the one-year period from the registration of the certificate of sale. Once this period lapses, the right is extinguished. What follows is no longer redemption but a possible repurchase, which is a new contract at the discretion of the new owner. Petitioners’ offer in 1990 was a belated attempt at repurchase, not redemption. The cited cases advocating liberal construction were inapplicable, as they involved circumstances like a valid tender within the redemption period, which was absent here. The alleged 1989 negotiation for an extension, even if true, did not revive the expired right and constituted at most a non-binding offer to resell. Allowing redemption years after the title had been consolidated and the property sold to innocent third parties would be unjust and unreasonable.