G.R. No. 127768 November 19, 1999
UNITED AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. WILLIE J. UY, respondent.

FACTS

Respondent Willie J. Uy, a passenger on United Airlines Flight 819 from San Francisco to Manila on October 13, 1989, experienced a series of distressing incidents. At check-in, an airline employee publicly rebuked him for an overweight bag, forcing him to repack in front of a crowd. His offer to pay overweight charges with a valid Miscellaneous Charge Order was refused. Upon arrival in Manila, he discovered one of his bags had been slashed and contents worth approximately US$5,310 were stolen. He immediately notified the airline of his loss and the humiliating treatment via a letter dated October 16, 1989. United Airlines responded with a check based on a limited liability rate, which Uy deemed inadequate. He subsequently sent two more demand letters, dated January 4, 1990, and October 28, 1991, seeking a substantial settlement for damages. After United Airlines refused, Uy filed a complaint for damages on June 9, 1992.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether the respondent’s cause of action for damages had prescribed under Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention, which extinguishes the right to damages if an action is not brought within two years from the date of arrival at the destination.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that the action had not prescribed. The Court clarified the interpretation of Article 29(1) and (2) of the Warsaw Convention. While paragraph (1) sets the two-year limitation period, paragraph (2) provides that “the method of calculating the period of limitation shall be determined by the law of the court to which the case is submitted.” This reference to domestic law includes the rules on interruption of the prescriptive period. Under Philippine law, specifically Article 1155 of the Civil Code, prescription is interrupted by a written extrajudicial demand by the creditor. The Court held that Uy’s letter of October 16, 1989, constituted a valid written extrajudicial demand. This demand effectively interrupted the running of the two-year prescriptive period. Consequently, the period started anew from the date of that demand. Since the complaint was filed on June 9, 1992, which was within two years from the interruption caused by the October 16, 1989 letter, the action was timely filed. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, which had reversed the trial court’s order of dismissal, and remanded the case for further proceedings on the merits.