G.R. No. 126947 . July 15, 1999.
HARRY ANG PING, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RTC-MAKATI, BRANCH 149 and UNIBANCARD CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS

In April 1987, Juan Tingson obtained a Unicard credit card from Unibancard Corporation, with petitioner Harry Ang Ping as co-obligor. They agreed to be jointly and severally liable for all charges. Tingson defaulted, accumulating a debt of P49,988.42. Unibancard filed a collection suit. Summonses for Tingson and Ang Ping were allegedly served via substituted service on February 15, 1988, at different addresses, but both were received by the same person, Jonas Umali. An answer was filed by an attorney purportedly representing both defendants.
During pre-trial and trial, a different attorney appeared for the defendants. No evidence was presented for the defense, leading the trial court to decide based solely on Unibancard’s evidence. A judgment was rendered on June 11, 1990, holding Tingson and Ang Ping jointly and severally liable. Writs of execution were subsequently enforced against Ang Ping’s properties. On October 27, 1994, Ang Ping filed a petition with the Court of Appeals to annul the trial court’s judgment, claiming lack of due process due to invalid service of summons and unauthorized legal representation.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner Harry Ang Ping, thereby rendering a valid judgment that could be enforced against him.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over Ang Ping’s person. Jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil case is acquired either by valid service of summons or voluntary appearance. Here, the substituted service of summons was defective. The return did not detail the earnest efforts to personally serve summons or the specific grounds justifying substituted service, as required by the rules. The fact that the same individual, Jonas Umali, received summons at two different addresses for two different defendants on the same day further indicated irregularity.
Moreover, Ang Ping did not voluntarily submit to the court’s authority. The appearance of counsel did not constitute voluntary appearance because Ang Ping sufficiently established that he never authorized the lawyers who filed the answer and appeared at hearings. The Court emphasized that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. Since Ang Ping was not properly served with summons and did not voluntarily appear, the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction over him and violated his right to due process. Consequently, the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the trial court’s judgment was set aside as to petitioner Ang Ping.