G.R. No. 124760 July 8, 1998
ANTONIA J. GUTANG, ELIZABETH J. GUTANG, and DAVID GUTANG, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge, Branch 35, Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Manila; HON. MARINO M. DE LA CRUZ, JR., Presiding Judge, Branch 22, NCJR, Manila, ALBERTO LOOYUKO; and JUAN UY, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Antonia J. Gutang, Elizabeth J. Gutang, and David Gutang filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition before the Court of Appeals seeking: (1) the annulment of the July 26, 1995 and September 5, 1995 orders issued by respondent Judge Marino M. dela Cruz, Jr. of the RTC Manila, Branch 22, wherein he voluntarily inhibited himself from Civil Case No. R-82-5792; (2) an order enjoining respondent Judge Ramon P. Makasiar of Branch 35 from further acting in the same case; and (3) an order for Judge dela Cruz, Jr. to reassume jurisdiction. The case originated from Civil Case No. R-82-5792. On August 30, 1994, Judge dela Cruz, Jr. granted private respondents’ motions for issuance of a final deed of sale, cancellation of TCT No. 242, issuance of a new title, and a writ of possession. Petitioner Antonia J. Gutang’s petition questioning this order before the CA was dismissed. On June 7, 1995, private respondents filed a Motion to Inhibit Judge dela Cruz, Jr., alleging he did not act on their motion for an alias writ of possession. On July 26, 1995, Judge dela Cruz, Jr. issued an order denying the motion for inhibition but voluntarily inhibiting himself, stating the Presiding Judge voluntarily inhibits himself. The case was re-raffled to Branch 35 presided by Judge Makasiar. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petitioners’ subsequent petition.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in not annulling the orders of inhibition and in not granting the petitions for mandamus and prohibition.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The rule on voluntary inhibition of judges is based on Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. The second paragraph allows a judge to disqualify himself for just and valid reasons other than those specifically mentioned. The decision to inhibit is left to the sound discretion and conscience of the judge based on a rational assessment of the circumstances. In this case, respondent Judge dela Cruz, Jr. had a just and valid reason for voluntarily inhibiting himself. Taking cue from Pimentel v. Salanga, the judge properly conducted a self-examination and exercised his discretion to preserve the people’s faith in the courts. When circumstances appear that induce doubt as to a judge’s impartiality, he has the discretion to inhibit himself to forestall any miscarriage of justice. The inhibition was valid, and the subsequent re-raffle to Branch 35 presided by Judge Makasiar was in accordance with Supreme Court Circular No. 7. Therefore, Judge Makasiar may properly proceed with the case, and the writ of prohibition prayed for cannot be granted.