GR 124699; (July, 2003) (Digest)
G.R. No. 124699 ; July 31, 2003
BOGO-MEDELLIN MILLING CO., INC., Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND HEIRS OF MAGDALENO VALDEZ SR., Respondents.
FACTS
The heirs of Magdaleno Valdez, Sr. filed a complaint for payment of compensation and/or recovery of possession against Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. (Bomedco). Their father purchased a parcel of land in 1935, which was already traversed by Bomedco’s railroad tracks used for hauling sugarcane. Upon the father’s death, the heirs inherited the land. Unknown to them, Bomedco had the central strip occupied by the tracks (Cadastral Lot No. 954) registered in its name during a 1965 cadastral survey. The heirs discovered this in 1989 and demanded compensation, leading to the lawsuit.
Bomedco claimed ownership of Lot No. 954, asserting a prior 1929 purchase from the same vendor. The trial court rejected Bomedco’s documentary evidence for the 1929 sale as inadmissible. However, it ruled for Bomedco, holding it acquired ownership through acquisitive prescription. It characterized Bomedco’s use as a continuous and apparent easement acquired after ten years under Article 620 of the Civil Code, and due to over 50 years of possession.
ISSUE
Whether Bomedco acquired ownership of the land through acquisitive prescription.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ reversal, ruling Bomedco did not acquire ownership. The legal logic proceeds from the nature of Bomedco’s possession. The Court clarified that Bomedco’s use of the land was merely that of an easement of right of way, not possession as an owner. Possession for purposes of acquisitive prescription must be in the concept of an owner—a fact Bomedco failed to establish. Its possession was merely tolerated by the true owners, the Valdez heirs, first by their father and later by them, especially since one heir was a Bomedco employee. Such tolerated possession does not constitute the adverse, exclusive, and notorious possession required for prescription.
Furthermore, the Court rejected the application of Article 620 on prescription for easements. That article governs the acquisition of easements themselves, not ownership of the servient estate. Bomedco’s claim was for ownership of the land, not merely for an easement. Since its possession was not in the concept of an owner, the prescriptive period for acquiring ownership never commenced. Consequently, Bomedco remained a mere user by tolerance. The Court ordered Bomedco to pay compensation to the heirs for the use of the land from the time the tolerance was withdrawn by the 1989 demand, and to remove its improvements, with attorney’s fees awarded.
