G.R. No. 124360 , December 3, 1997.
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, respondents.

G.R. No. 127867 December 3, 1997.
EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOKER P. ARROYO, ENRIQUE GARCIA, WIGBERTO TAÑADA, FLAG HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION, INC., FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION (FDC), SANLAKAS, petitioners, vs. HON. RUBEN TORRES, in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, HON. FRANCISCO VIRAY, in his capacity as the Secretary of Energy, CALTEX Philippines, Inc., PETRON Corporation, and PILIPINAS SHELL Corporation, respondents.
EASTERN PETROLEUM CORP., SEAOIL PETROLEUM CORP., SUBIC BAY DISTRIBUTION, INC., TWA, INC., and DUBPHIL GAS, Movants-in-Intervention.

FACTS

The main case involves consolidated petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 , the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act. The Supreme Court, in a decision penned by Justice Puno, declared R.A. No. 8180 unconstitutional in its entirety. The case is now at the motion for reconsideration stage. Public respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, while petitioner Enrique T. Garcia and movants-in-intervention filed partial motions for reconsideration. Justice Kapunan, in a separate concurring and dissenting opinion, addresses these motions.

ISSUE

Whether the Supreme Court should reconsider its decision declaring the entire R.A. No. 8180 unconstitutional, and whether the three specific anti-competition provisions (on tariff differential, minimum inventory, and predatory pricing) are severable from the rest of the law, allowing the constitutional portions to remain in force.

RULING

Justice Kapunan, in his separate opinion, concurs in part and dissents in part from the majority’s resolution denying the motions for reconsideration. He concurs with the majority in maintaining that the three anti-competition provisions of R.A. No. 8180 are unconstitutional. However, he dissents from the majority’s ruling that the entire law is unconstitutional. He argues that the three offending provisions are severable from the main statute. The removal of these provisions would not affect the validity and enforceability of the remaining provisions, as the law, sans the unconstitutional parts, remains complete, sensible, capable of execution, and wholly independent of the rejected portions. The presence of a separability clause in the law creates a presumption of legislative intent for separability. The principal legislative intent to open the oil market to fair and free competition would be better served by excising the anti-competition provisions. The remaining provisions, such as those on liberalization of the industry, promotion of fair trade, and prevention of cartels, are sufficient to constitute a workable law that carries out the legislative will. Therefore, only the three specific provisions should be struck down as unconstitutional, and the rest of R.A. No. 8180 should remain in force and effect.