G.R. No. 122629 . December 2, 1998.
PEPSI COLA PRODUCTS PHIL., INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR., SPS. EDGARDO DE VERA and SALVACION LOCSIN DE VERA and ANNA A. LOCSIN, respondents.

FACTS

This case originated from the “Pepsi Number Fever” promotion. Private respondents, unpaid holders of the winning “349” crowns, filed a collection case against petitioner Pepsi Cola Products Philippines, Inc. (PCPPI) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. While private respondents promptly concluded their evidence presentation, petitioner repeatedly sought postponements for its turn to present evidence, primarily due to the unavailability of its witnesses. Several initial settings were cancelled due to the judge’s absence or leave.
The RTC, under Judge Sixto Marella, Jr., eventually set the case for petitioner’s evidence on January 20, 1995, with a clear warning that the setting was “intransferrable in character.” Despite this, on the hearing date, petitioner’s counsel orally moved for postponement, claiming its witnesses were preoccupied with other cases in Iriga City and Pasig. The trial court denied the motion and issued an order declaring that petitioner had waived its right to present further evidence, deeming the case submitted for decision.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s order denying petitioner’s motion for postponement and declaring a waiver of its right to present evidence.

RULING

The Supreme Court upheld the rulings of the lower courts. The grant or denial of a motion for postponement is discretionary upon the trial court. This discretion was not abused. The trial court had already granted petitioner several postponements and issued a final, explicit warning that the January 20, 1995 hearing was non-transferable. Petitioner disregarded this warning and only made a verbal motion on the day itself, failing to file a written motion in advance despite knowing for two months that its witnesses had conflicting schedules.
The Court emphasized that a litigant cannot presume a postponement will be automatically granted. Petitioner’s explanation—that it hoped a witness would become available at the last hour—was deemed preposterous, as it knew the witnesses were in different cities. The Court also noted counsel’s dilatory tactics, which are viewed with disfavor as they hinder the proper administration of justice. Given the ample opportunity already afforded and the failure to comply with the court’s directive, the declaration of waiver was a proper exercise of judicial discretion to prevent further delay. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.