G.R. No. 121157 July 31, 1997
HEIRS OF SEGUNDA MANINGDING, represented by DELFIN, GIL, EMMA, MANUEL, RACQUEL, ESTER, REMEDIOS and JESSIE, all surnamed PARAYNO, MAXIMA PARAYNO, LEONARDO PARAYNO and FELICISIMA PARAYNO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROQUE BAUZON (deceased), represented by his heirs and co-defendants Luis and Eriberta Bauzon; LUIS BAUZON, ERIBERTA BAUZON (deceased), substituted by her husband PLACIDO ZULUETA, and JOSE PARAYNO, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners, heirs of Segunda Maningding, filed an action for annulment of documents, accounting, and partition of two unregistered parcels of land (a riceland and a sugarland) in Calasiao, Pangasinan. They claimed co-ownership with private respondents Luis and Eriberta Bauzon over the lots, which they alleged formed part of the estate of Ramon Bauzon y Untalan, who died intestate in 1948. The surviving children were Roque Bauzon, Juan Maningding, Maria Maningding, and Segunda Maningding. Petitioners asserted that Roque Bauzon repudiated the co-ownership over the sugarland in 1965 via an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, and that in 1970, Juan and Maria Maningding quitclaimed their shares over the riceland in favor of Roque Bauzon. Roque later transferred the riceland to his son Luis and the sugarland to his daughter Eriberta via deeds of sale. The heirs of Segunda Maningding discovered these transfers only in 1986 and sought partition and accounting.
Private respondents, represented by Roque Bauzon’s heirs, claimed Roque acquired ownership through a deed of donation propter nuptias from his parents on April 21, 1926, and had been in open, continuous, adverse, and actual possession since his father’s death in 1948. They also averred that Segunda Maningding was a signatory to the 1970 Affidavit of Quitclaim and Renunciation.
The trial court found the lots part of Ramon Bauzon’s estate, devolving equally to his four children. It awarded the lots to Segunda Maningding and Roque Bauzon as co-owners in equal shares, finding that Juan and Maria had quitclaimed their shares. It rejected the deed of donation for lack of proof of due execution and authenticity, and nullified the subsequent deeds of sale for conveying Segunda’s half-share.
The Court of Appeals initially ruled the properties validly pertained to Roque via the donation propter nuptias, but upon reconsideration, declared the donation void for non-compliance with Article 633 of the old Civil Code, which required a public instrument. However, it upheld Roque’s ownership by acquisitive prescription.

ISSUE

Whether Roque Bauzon acquired ownership over the disputed parcels of land by acquisitive prescription.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ resolution, holding that Roque Bauzon acquired ownership by acquisitive prescription.
The Court explained that prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership through possession under conditions laid down by law. Acquisitive prescription may be ordinary (possession in good faith with just title for 10 years) or extraordinary (uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years without need of title or good faith). The disputed lots are unregistered lands, and while tax declarations alone are not conclusive proof of ownership, they constitute strong evidence when coupled with proof of actual possession.
Even assuming the donation propter nuptias was void for lack of a public instrument, it could still serve as a legal basis for adverse possession. Citing Pensader v. Pensader and Espique v. Espique, the Court ruled that a void donation may explain the adverse and exclusive character of possession. Roque Bauzon possessed the lands in the concept of an owner—publicly, peacefully, uninterruptedly, and in good faith—based on his belief in the validity of the donation. He personally tilled the land and appropriated all produce to the exclusion of others.
The donation was made in 1926, and the heirs of Segunda Maningding demanded partition only in 1986—a lapse of 60 years. Even counting from Ramon Bauzon’s death in 1948, more than 30 years had passed. Testimony from petitioner Delfin Parayno confirmed that Roque and his heirs had been in continuous, adverse, and public possession from 1948 to 1986 (36 years), satisfying the period for extraordinary prescription.
The Court noted that prescription generally does not run among co-owners unless there is a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and such repudiation is communicated to the other co-owners. Here, Roque Bauzon’s acts of ownership were clear, complete, and conclusive—he exclusively possessed the properties and never gave petitioners their share of the fruits. Petitioners slept on their rights for nearly 36 years. Therefore, acquisitive prescription had set in favor of Roque Bauzon.
The petition was denied, and the Court of Appeals’ resolution was affirmed.