GR 120972 1999 (Digest)
G.R. No. 120972 . July 19, 1999.
SPOUSES JOSE and EVANGELINE AGUILAR, SPS. DOMINGO and SIXTA AGUILAR, AMBROSIO DELOS REYES, and SPS. FRANCISCO DELOS REYES, EMILIA MERCADO REYES, SPS. JOSE and ROSA Y VILLARAMA, RUBY IBANEZ, MAGNO MANALO and VALENTINO MAGSARILI, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, PAZ G. PALANCA and ROMEO REYES, Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff In-Charge, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Caloocan City, Metro Manila; ESPERANZA T. ECHIVERRI and FERNANDO G. CRUZ, Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff In-Charge, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Valenzuela, Metro Manila; JOSE R. ORTIZ, JR. and HECTOR L. GALURA, Clerk of Court, and Ex-Officio Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff In-Charge, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Pasay City, Metro Manila; PIO Z. MARTINEZ and NICANOR D. BLANCO, Ex-Officio Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff In-Charge, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Regional, Antipolo, Rizal, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners filed a Motion for Extension of Time on July 25, 1995, seeking thirty days to file a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals’ Decision dated September 30, 1994, and its Resolution dated February 2, 1995, denying their motion for reconsideration. They alleged receiving a copy of the February 2, 1995 Resolution on July 11, 1995. Private respondent San Miguel Corporation opposed, contending the decision had become final and executory on March 29, 1995, with entry of judgment made by the Court of Appeals on May 5, 1995. The petition was filed on August 25, 1995. The Court of Appeals rollo showed that a copy of the February 2, 1995 Resolution was sent to petitioners’ counsel of record, Atty. Almario T. Amador, via registered mail on February 7, 1995, but the envelope was returned stamped “unclaimed” with notations “second notice/2-13” and “third notice/2-14.” A copy was then sent to petitioner Jose Aguilar on March 2, 1995, but it was returned with the annotation “moved.” The Decision was entered in the Book of Judgments on May 5, 1995. The Supreme Court required petitioners to submit their counsel’s name and address, which they failed to do despite being granted an extension.
ISSUE
Whether service upon Atty. Amador, petitioners’ counsel of record, and upon petitioner Jose Aguilar may be deemed complete, thereby making the entry of judgment on May 5, 1995, valid and rendering the Court of Appeals’ decision final and executory.
RULING
The petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals had already been entered in the Book of Judgments on May 5, 1995, and is final and executory.
1. Regarding service on Atty. Amador: Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt. The exception, where service is deemed complete upon expiration of five days from the first notice of the postmaster if the mail is unclaimed, requires conclusive proof that a first notice was duly sent and received by the addressee. The mere notations on the returned envelope (“unclaimed,” “second notice,” “third notice”) are insufficient. There was no postmaster’s certification or other conclusive proof that a first notice was sent to and received by Atty. Amador. Therefore, the presumption of constructive service did not arise for the mail addressed to counsel.
2. Regarding service on Jose Aguilar: However, service upon petitioner Jose Aguilar himself was deemed complete. The copy sent to him on March 2, 1995, was returned with the annotation “moved.” Jurisprudence holds that a party has the duty to inform the court of any change of address. Failure to do so constitutes negligence, and the risk of non-receipt of court notices falls upon the party. Since Jose Aguilar did not notify the court of his change of address, service at his address of record was valid. The period to appeal thus began from such service.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals’ decision had long become final and executory when petitioners filed their motion for extension on July 25, 1995. The Supreme Court no longer had jurisdiction to review the decision.
