GR 119601; (December, 1996) (Digest)
G.R. No. 119601 December 17, 1996
DANILO BUHAT, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS
An Information for Homicide was filed against petitioner Danilo Buhat and two John Does, alleging that on October 16, 1992, Buhat, armed with a knife, attacked and killed Ramon George Yu while two unknown assailants held the victim’s arms, “using superior strength.” Buhat pleaded not guilty and trial ensued. Subsequently, the Secretary of Justice, upon appeal by the private complainant, ordered the City Prosecutor to amend the Information to upgrade the charge to Murder and to implead additional accused Herminia Altavas and Osmeña Altavas. The prosecution filed a motion for leave to amend the information accordingly, which Buhat opposed.
The Regional Trial Court denied the motion to amend, invoking judicial discretion and finding the inquest prosecutor’s resolution more persuasive. The Solicitor General elevated the matter via certiorari to the Court of Appeals, which granted the petition, set aside the RTC order, and allowed the amendment from Homicide to Murder and the inclusion of the additional accused. Buhat filed the instant petition, arguing the amendment is a substantial alteration proscribed after his plea.
ISSUE
Whether the amendment of the Information from Homicide to Murder and the inclusion of additional accused, after the petitioner had pleaded not guilty, constitutes a substantial amendment prejudicial to the rights of the accused.
RULING
The petition lacks merit. The amendment is formal, not substantial. A substantial amendment affects the essence of the accusation and alters the theory of the defense, which is prohibited after plea. Here, the original Information already alleged that Buhat attacked the victim while two others held the victim’s arms, “using superior strength.” This phrase is an allegation of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, which qualifies the killing to Murder. Thus, the amendment from Homicide to Murder merely made explicit what was already substantially alleged in the original charge. It did not change the nature of the offense charged.
Furthermore, the inclusion of the names of the additional accused, replacing the “John Does,” is also a formal amendment. The original Information already alleged the participation of two other assailants. Naming them does not alter Buhat’s theory of defense, as his alleged criminal participation as a principal by direct participation remains unchanged. The amendment does not charge a different offense nor introduce a new material fact that would require a new defense. Consequently, the amendment is allowed under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, as it is merely formal and does not prejudice the rights of the accused. The Court of Appeals correctly allowed the amendment.