G.R. No. 119341 . November 29, 1999.
EDUARDO FONTANILLA, SR. and ELLEN M.T. FONTANILLA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and LUIS DUAMAN, respondents.

FACTS

Spouses Crisanto and Feliciana Duaman were homestead patent grantees. Upon their death, their son, respondent Luis Duaman, inherited a four-hectare portion. To facilitate his sons’ loan application, Luis transferred this land to his sons, Ernesto and Elpidio Duaman, in 1976. In 1985, facing imminent foreclosure by the bank, Ernesto and Elpidio sold a two-hectare portion to petitioner Eduardo Fontanilla, Sr., with the deed naming his daughter, petitioner Ellen Fontanilla, as the vendee. Title was subsequently issued in Ellen’s name.
Later, Luis Duaman informed the Fontanillas of his desire to repurchase the land. When they refused, Luis filed an action for repurchase under Section 119 of the Public Land Act ( Commonwealth Act No. 141 ). The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Luis, as a legal heir of the original homesteaders, retained the right to repurchase despite not being the direct vendor to the Fontanillas.

ISSUE

Whether respondent Luis Duaman, who was not the vendor in the sale to the petitioners, can validly exercise the right to repurchase the homestead under Section 119 of the Public Land Act.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, ruling that Luis Duaman validly exercised his right of repurchase. The legal logic centers on the interpretation of Section 119, which states: “Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions… shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the date of conveyance.” The provision does not require that the repurchaser must be the conveyor. Its plain intent is to preserve the homestead for the family of the grantee. As a legal heir of the original homesteaders, Luis qualifies to exercise this right.
Petitioners erroneously cited Madarcos vs. de la Merced, arguing only the vendor can repurchase. The Court clarified that Madarcos involved a co-heir attempting to repurchase another heir’s already partitioned share, which is factually distinct. Here, Luis seeks to repurchase his own inherited share. Furthermore, the five-year period is not reckoned from the 1976 transfer from Luis to his sons, as that intra-family conveyance did not remove the land from the homesteader’s family circle and is thus not the “conveyance” contemplated by Section 119. The reckoning date is the 1985 sale to the petitioners, third parties outside the family. Since Luis filed his action in 1989, it was within the five-year period. The Court emphasized the law must be liberally construed to achieve its purpose of keeping homesteads within the grantee’s family.