G.R. No. 119118 . February 19, 2001.
RUFINO VALENCIA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF BO. STA. CRUZ, PAOMBONG, BULACAN, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Rufino Valencia leased a fishpond from the Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos (RCBM), paying substantial rent and making a large investment in fingerlings. Private respondents, claiming ownership, filed a case against RCBM and secured a preliminary injunction. The trial court initially allowed a different lessee, Rodrigo Bagtas, to operate the fishpond under court supervision, dispossessing Valencia. Valencia intervened, asserting his leasehold rights and filing a counterclaim for his investment. After protracted proceedings, the trial court eventually upheld RCBM’s title and the validity of Valencia’s lease contract but dismissed his monetary counterclaim for lack of evidence.
Valencia moved for execution pending appeal of the portion of the judgment recognizing his right to possession, arguing it was unfair to keep him dispossessed. He also filed a petition for relief from judgment regarding the dismissal of his counterclaim, alleging his former counsel’s excusable negligence in failing to pursue it. The newly assigned trial judge denied the motion for execution, finding no cogent reason under the Rules, and deferred action on the petition for relief. Valencia then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court’s denial of the motion for execution pending appeal and its deferral of action on the petition for relief from judgment.

RULING

The Court of Appeals did not err, and its decision is affirmed. The grant or denial of a motion for execution pending appeal under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is discretionary upon the trial court. The trial court’s denial, anchored on its finding that the appealed judgment had vacated the favorable portion for Valencia and that no special circumstances justified immediate execution, was a sound exercise of discretion. There was no showing of capricious, arbitrary, or whimsical exercise of judgment constituting grave abuse of discretion warranting correction by certiorari.
Regarding the petition for relief, the trial court’s deferral of action was also proper. A petition for relief is an equitable remedy allowed only when other remedies are unavailable. Here, Valencia’s proper recourse from the dismissal of his counterclaim was an ordinary appeal. His failure to timely appeal, allegedly due to counsel’s negligence, did not automatically justify a petition for relief, as such negligence is generally binding on the client. The trial court correctly reasoned that acting on the petition for relief while the main judgment was on appeal would be premature and could pre-empt the appellate court’s review. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly found no grave abuse of discretion in the trial court’s assailed orders.