GR 118435; (June, 1997) (Digest)
G.R. No. 118435 June 20, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIO SERZO, JR., accused-appellant.
FACTS
Accused-appellant Mario Serzo, Jr. was charged with Murder for stabbing Alfredo Alcantara at the back on August 22, 1990, in Antipolo, Rizal. The prosecution evidence established that the victim and his wife, Adelaida Alcantara, responded to a plea for help from the appellant’s mother to rescue grandchildren held inside a house by the appellant. After rescuing the children, while returning to their house, the appellant attacked Alfredo from behind, stabbing him in the back, overpowered him, and repeatedly stabbed him in a canal. Adelaida witnessed the attack, shouted for help, and fought the appellant, who then fled. The victim died from three stab wounds. During the trial, the appellant repeatedly appeared without counsel. Initially, the court appointed Atty. Wilfredo Lina-ac as counsel de oficio for arraignment, but the appellant requested time to hire his own counsel. He was eventually arraigned with Atty. Lina-ac’s assistance. Throughout the proceedings, the appellant failed to secure a counsel de parte despite several opportunities and resetting of hearings. The court subsequently appointed other counsel de oficio, but the appellant refused to cooperate with them, declining to take the witness stand. The defense thus rested without presenting evidence. The trial court convicted the appellant of Murder based on the prosecution’s evidence, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay damages.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court denied the appellant his right to counsel by not giving him sufficient time to engage counsel of his own choice and thereby deprived him of the chance to present evidence for his defense.
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that the appellant was not denied his right to counsel. The right to counsel is absolute, but the option to hire one of his own choice is not without limitation and cannot be used to delay proceedings. The trial court afforded the appellant ample opportunity to secure a counsel de parte from January 8, 1991, until November 5, 1992. The appellant’s refusal to cooperate with appointed counsel de oficio and his failure to hire his own counsel constituted a waiver of his right to present evidence. The Court found that the appellant’s right to counsel was not violated, as the trial court acted within its discretion to prevent dilatory tactics and ensure the speedy disposition of the case. The conviction was affirmed based on the prosecution’s evidence, which positively identified the appellant as the assailant and established treachery in the attack.
