GR 117929; (November, 1999) (Digest)
G.R. No. 117929 November 26, 1999
CORA VERGARA, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. CAMILO O. MONTESA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC-Malolos, Br. 19 and SPS. NAZARIO and ZENAIDA BARRETO, respondents.
FACTS
Private respondents Nazario and Zenaida Baretto filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money against petitioner Cora Vergara. The complaint alleged that on May 28, 1993, petitioner’s husband borrowed P50,000.00 from them and executed a promissory note payable within June 1993. The husband died on June 25, 1993, without paying the loan. Subsequently, on July 15, 1993, petitioner herself executed another promissory note undertaking to pay the indebtedness. Both notes were annexed to the complaint. After several unsuccessful demands, the private respondents filed the suit on November 12, 1993.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint stated no cause of action. She argued that the money claim, being against her deceased husband, should be filed as a claim in the estate proceedings pursuant to Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. The trial court denied the motion, finding the grounds not indubitable and evidentiary in nature, requiring a trial. The court also directed petitioner to file her answer within ten days. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s orders, prompting this petition.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in denying the motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action and in shortening the period to file an answer to ten days.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition. On the first issue, the Court held that a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action must be determined solely from the allegations in the complaint. The complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable breach: a loan from the respondents, a promissory note by the husband, his death, and a subsequent promissory note executed by petitioner assuming the obligation. The defenses raised by petitioner—that she could not have assumed her husband’s obligation and that novation could not have taken place—are matters of defense requiring evidence, not proper for resolution in a motion to dismiss. The complaint on its face did not clearly show that respondents were entitled to no relief under any provable state of facts. Therefore, the denial of the motion to dismiss was correct, as liability is a question to be resolved after a trial on the merits.
On the second issue, the Court found no error in the ten-day period to answer. Under Rule 16, Section 4, when a motion to dismiss is denied, the defendant has the full reglementary period to answer from receipt of the denial, unless the court provides a different period. The trial court provided a ten-day period, which was reasonable under the circumstances. The records showed that from the receipt of summons to the filing of her answer, petitioner had a total of 103 days. Furthermore, petitioner’s counsel did not seek relief from the order or attempt to have it set aside. Thus, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error.