GR 117247 Davide (Digest)
G.R. No. 117247 , April 12, 1996
Manuel I. Ramirez, Petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and Esmeraldo Ponce, Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Manuel I. Ramirez filed an application for land registration. The trial court, in LRC Case No. B-526, issued an order on 13 May 1991 confirming his imperfect title and ordering the registration of the land in his favor. Pursuant to this order, a decree of registration was issued, followed by the issuance of an original certificate of title. Private respondent Esmeraldo Ponce, who did not file an opposition to Ramirez’s application during the registration proceedings, subsequently sought to challenge the decree.
Ponce filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Supreme Court on 14 February 1994, seeking to annul the decree. The Supreme Court referred this petition to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals gave due course to the certiorari petition filed by Ponce.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly gave due course to the special civil action for certiorari filed by the private respondent to annul the decree of registration.
RULING
No, the Court of Appeals should not have given due course to the special civil action for certiorari. The proper remedies against a decree of registration are specifically provided by law. Under Section 32 of the Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529), a petition to reopen the case must be filed within one year from the entry of the decree. Other available judicial remedies are an ordinary action for reconveyance or an action for damages against the Assurance Fund.
A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is not an appropriate remedy in this context. Certiorari is generally reserved for correcting errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Here, the trial court acted within its jurisdiction in issuing the decree following its confirmation order. Furthermore, since the private respondent was not even an oppositor in the original land registration case, he lacked the standing typically required for such a direct challenge. Even if he had been an oppositor, his remedy would have been an ordinary appeal from the trial court’s order, not a petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals therefore erred in entertaining the petition, as it allowed a procedural shortcut that bypasses the specific, time-bound remedies established under the property registration system.
