GR 116506; (May, 1995) (Digest)
G.R. No. 116506 May 22, 1995
Billy P. Obugan, petitioner, vs. The People of the Philippines and Hon. Salvador J. Valdez, Jr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch V of the RTC, Baguio City, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Billy Obugan was convicted in two criminal cases for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. After the promulgation of the judgment on January 10, 1994, he filed a motion for reconsideration and later an urgent motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration but granted the motion for new trial. A trial de novo was conducted, after which the court issued an order on June 3, 1994, affirming the original decision.
Petitioner received a copy of this order on June 6, 1994, and filed a motion for reconsideration on June 17, 1994. However, on June 20, 1994, the trial court issued a notice of entry of judgment, declaring the January 10, 1994 decision final and executory, and denied petitioner’s subsequent motions. The court reasoned that the period to appeal should be counted from the original promulgation, deducting only the time the motion for new trial was pending, which meant petitioner’s June 17 motion was filed out of time.
ISSUE
Whether the fifteen-day period to appeal should be counted from the notice of the order affirming the original decision after a granted motion for new trial and a trial de novo.
RULING
The Supreme Court granted the petition, ruling in favor of the petitioner. The Court held that when a motion for new trial is granted and a trial de novo is conducted, the original judgment is effectively vacated. Consequently, any subsequent order affirming the original decision after the new trial constitutes a new judgment. The period to appeal must therefore be reckoned from the party’s receipt of notice of this new judgment or order.
The trial court erred in computing the appeal period from the original promulgation date. Since petitioner received the June 3, 1994 order on June 6, his motion for reconsideration filed on June 17 was timely, as the fifteen-day period began from June 6. Thus, the decision had not become final and executory, and the issuance of the notice of entry of judgment was premature. The Court set aside the challenged orders and directed the trial court to recall the petitioner’s transfer to the national penitentiary.