GR 115951; (March, 1997) (Digest)
G.R. No. 115951 March 26, 1997
ZEBRA SECURITY AGENCY AND ALLIED SERVICES and/or NORMA G. ORTIZ, and MA. THERESA ESTAVILLO, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, GREGORIO CALASAN, Labor Arbiter; LINO R. DELA CRUZ, LEONARDO PASCUAL, JOAQUIN OLIVEROS, ANTONIO DOLLENTE, EDWIN CLARIN, ROMEO TAMAYO, and PACIFICO ANDRES, respondents.
FACTS
Private respondents, security guards, filed complaints for monetary claims against petitioners Ma. Theresa Estavillo, doing business as Zebra Security Agency (ZEBRA), and her mother/manager Norma Ortiz. Petitioners denied employment of some guards and claimed ZEBRA only legally operated from March 1988, thus could not be liable for pre-1988 claims. They argued Armor Security Services (ARMOR), which previously employed the guards, was a separate corporate entity. Respondents countered that ARMOR and ZEBRA were effectively the same, managed by Ortiz, with Estavillo as a dummy, making ZEBRA liable for ARMOR’s obligations.
The Labor Arbiter awarded monetary benefits to the guards. Petitioners failed to appeal, making the decision final. They later filed a petition for relief, treated as an appeal, but the NLRC denied it. This Court subsequently dismissed petitioners’ certiorari petition for being filed out of time. After remand for execution, petitioners filed a motion to quash, presenting new affidavits of retraction from some guards and alleging the guards’ position papers were perjured.
ISSUE
Whether the National Labor Relations Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the Labor Arbiter’s order denying the motion to quash the writ of execution.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion. The core legal principle is the immutability of final judgments. The Labor Arbiter’s decision had long become final and executory. A final judgment can no longer be altered, except for clerical errors or where its execution becomes impossible or unjust. Petitioners’ new evidence, consisting of affidavits of retraction, surfaced only after finality. Retractions are notoriously unreliable and viewed with suspicion, often considered a mere afterthought to nullify a completed proceeding. The attempt to re-litigate the case via a motion to quash execution was a prohibited collateral attack on a final judgment.
The Court emphasized that execution is the ministerial duty to enforce a final decision. The Labor Arbiter correctly denied the motion to quash, as the grounds raised pertained to the merits already settled with finality. The NLRC’s affirmation was thus proper. The petition was merely a dilatory tactic to avoid a lawful obligation. The denial of the motion to quash did not constitute a denial of due process, as petitioners had their day in court but lost due to their own failure to timely appeal and present evidence.