GR 113638; (November, 1999) (Digest)
G.R. No. 113638 November 16, 1999
A. D. GOTHONG MANUFACTURING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION-ALU, petitioner, vs. HON. NIEVES CONFESOR, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and A.D. GOTHONG MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Union filed a petition for certification election to represent the regular rank-and-file employees of respondent Company, excluding office staff. The Company opposed the exclusion of office personnel. During inclusion-exclusion proceedings, the parties agreed that the votes of Romulo Plaza and Paul Michael Yap would be challenged on the ground they were supervisory employees. The election resulted in 20 votes for union representation and 19 against, with 2 challenged votes from Plaza and Yap. The Union insisted both were supervisors, submitting affidavits and company memoranda as evidence. One affidavit alleged Yap could effectively recommend suspensions, while memoranda listed Plaza and Yap as attendees at meetings for department heads/supervisors and referenced Plaza as an acting officer-in-charge.
The Mediator-Arbiter declared Plaza and Yap to be rank-and-file employees. The Secretary of Labor affirmed this decision. The Company countered the Union’s evidence, arguing that a signatory to one document was not the corporate secretary and that a planned Davao branch where Plaza was supposedly assigned never materialized. The Union’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting this petition for review.
ISSUE
Whether the Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the finding that Romulo Plaza and Paul Michael Yap are rank-and-file employees, not supervisory or managerial employees.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion. The Court emphasized that the determination of an employee’s classification as managerial, supervisory, or rank-and-file is a factual issue. Under Article 212(m) of the Labor Code, a supervisory employee must possess the authority to effectively recommend managerial actions, such as hiring or discipline, and this authority must involve the use of independent judgment, not be merely routinary. The Court cited precedent stating that recommendatory powers subject to evaluation and final action by higher executives do not constitute the exercise of independent judgment required by law.
The Court deferred to the factual findings of the Med-Arbiter and the Secretary of Labor, which are accorded respect and finality when supported by substantial evidence. The evidence presented by the Union, including contested affidavits and documents, was deemed insufficient to conclusively establish that Plaza and Yap wielded independent judgment in recommending managerial actions. The Company’s evidence, such as certifications that a branch assignment did not materialize, supported the classification as rank-and-file. As the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, it found no capricious exercise of judgment warranting reversal. The petition was denied for lack of merit.
