GR 113549; (July, 1996) (Digest)
G.R. No. 113549 July 5, 1996
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (Represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS), petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF LUIS RIBAYA, respondents.
FACTS
In 1925, spouses Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris applied for registration of a large parcel of land in Albay under Plan II-13961. The Court of First Instance granted their application. Subsequently, a resurvey was conducted at their instance, resulting in an amended plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.) which significantly reduced the land area and subdivided it into four lots. This amended plan was not republished. A decree and Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 3947 were issued based on the amended plan. The title was later reconstituted and subdivided among the Ribaya heirs.
In 1978, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Director of Lands, filed a complaint to annul OCT No. 3947 and all subsequent titles. The Republic alleged the land was inalienable forest land at the time of application and that the registration court lacked jurisdiction due to the non-publication of the amended survey plan. Sixty-two farmer-occupants intervened, seeking reversion of the land to the public domain and confirmation of their own claims.
ISSUE
Whether the original certificate of title and all subsequent titles derived from it are null and void.
RULING
Yes, the titles are null and void. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision and reversed the Court of Appeals. The core legal principle is that publication of the notice of initial hearing is jurisdictional in land registration cases. The resurvey and amended plan, which altered the identity and total area of the land from a single parcel to four distinct lots, constituted a substantial amendment. The failure to republish the notice of hearing for this amended plan was a fatal jurisdictional defect. Consequently, the registration court never acquired jurisdiction over the land as described in the amended plan, rendering the ensuing decree and title void ab initio.
Furthermore, the Court found the land was classified as public forest and only released for disposition in 1930, years after the 1925 application. Thus, it was not alienable at the time of the registration proceedings. The title, being void from the outset, could not become valid through lapse of time. All subsequent titles emanating from the void OCT are likewise void. The land was ordered reverted to the public domain. The Court of Appeals erred in revisiting factual findings conclusively established by the trial court, especially concerning the land classification and the jurisdictional defect of non-publication.