G.R. No. 112719 January 29, 1997
People of the Philippines vs. Ernesto Omotoy y Cariaga

FACTS

The accused, Ernesto Omotoy, was charged with Arson under Presidential Decree No. 1613. The prosecution alleged that on July 6, 1986, in Gonzaga, Cagayan, Omotoy and several unidentified companions set fire to the house of spouses Rosario and Editha Mirafuente while the family was inside. The spouses testified they were awakened by stones hitting their house. Peeping out, they recognized Omotoy in a well-lit area and heard him make a statement they understood as referencing a prior dispute. They saw Omotoy set their cogon roof on fire with a match. Rosario’s brother, Arthur, also witnessed the arson and identified Omotoy when he entered a lighted area. The house was completely burned.
Omotoy denied the accusation and interposed the defense of alibi. He claimed he was at home that night attending to his seriously ill wife and could not have been at the crime scene. He asserted he had no grudge against the Mirafuentes. Defense witnesses, including the Barangay Captain, testified that the victims initially did not name any suspect. The trial court found the prosecution’s evidence credible and convicted Omotoy.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in convicting the accused based on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty. The Court upheld the trial court’s assessment of witness credibility, finding no reason to deviate from its conclusions. The positive identification of Omotoy by three eyewitnesses—the spouses and Arthur Mirafuente—who had a clear view under sufficient illumination, prevailed over his weak alibi. Alibi cannot stand against positive identification, especially when the accused failed to prove it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene. The witnesses’ relationship to the victim did not impair their credibility, as relationship alone does not render testimony biased, particularly when their account is clear and consistent.
However, the Court disagreed with the trial court’s appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling. The information alleged the house was occupied at the time of the fire, which is an element of the crime under the specific sub-section of P.D. 1613, not a mere aggravating circumstance. Since this circumstance was already inherent in the offense as charged and proven, it could not be used to increase the penalty. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty was within the range of prision mayor as minimum to reclusion temporal as maximum. The Court thus modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.