GR 112371; (October, 1998) (Digest)
G.R. No. 112371 October 7, 1998
AIDA DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
FACTS
Petitioner Aida Domingo was appointed Regional Director of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) Region V. Several government vehicles were endorsed to her office for official use. Despite being assigned a government vehicle, she collected a total of P48,600.00 as commutable transportation allowance for the period from July 1, 1988, to December 31, 1990. The Regional Auditor informed her that officials provided with government vehicles were prohibited from collecting transportation allowances and requested her to cease such collections. Petitioner sought reconsideration, contending she should only be disallowed from claiming the allowance on days she actually used a government vehicle and that she had refunded P1,600.00 for 32 days of actual use. The auditor denied her motion, and the Commission on Audit (COA) affirmed the disallowance based on COA Decision No. 1745, which held that a government official assigned a vehicle is not entitled to collect transportation allowance whether or not the vehicle is actually used.
ISSUE
Whether a government official provided with a government vehicle may claim a commutable transportation allowance for days the official did not actually use the vehicle.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the COA decision. The relevant provisions of the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1988, 1989, 1990, and 1991 explicitly state that transportation allowance shall not be granted to officials who are “assigned a government vehicle.” The law uses the word “assigned,” not “used.” The Court, citing Webster’s Dictionary, defined “assign” as “to transfer (property) to another in trust.” The legislative intent is clear: if the intent were to disallow allowance only when the vehicle is used, the law would have employed the word “use.” The Court also cited the case of Bustamante vs. Commissioner on Audit, which held that COA Circular No. 75-6 makes the use of a government vehicle and the claim for transportation allowance mutually exclusive. The fact that the vehicles were assigned to the Regional Office, not personally to the petitioner, is immaterial, as they were intended for the office’s official use, and she could have used them whenever needed. The evil sought to be remedied is the collection of additional transportation allowance despite the availability of free government transportation.