G.R. No. 112089 & G.R. No. 112737 . January 24, 2001.
Remedios A. Dupasquier, et al., petitioners, vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., respondents. / Hon. Eduardo G. Montenegro, et al., petitioners, vs. Court of Appeals and Fortunato M. Dizon, Jr., respondents.

FACTS

These consolidated petitions arose from the prosecution of Banco Filipino officials for estafa concerning alleged irregular loans to corporate subsidiaries. After a 1987 complaint, a prosecutor recommended filing informations, which were filed in August 1988. Accused officials sought reinvestigation, citing irregularities. In 1991, a panel of prosecutors recommended dismissal for lack of probable cause. However, Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro reversed this, ordering prosecution. The accused moved for reconsideration and appealed to the Secretary of Justice, but their appeals were denied.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 112089 (Banco Filipino officials) and respondent in G.R. No. 112737 (Fortunato Dizon, Jr.) separately challenged these prosecutorial resolutions via certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the petition of the Banco Filipino officials. However, in Dizon’s separate case, the CA granted his petition, set aside the Secretary of Justice’s resolution, and ordered the dismissal of the charges against him. The Banco Filipino officials then filed a supplemental motion, arguing that since Dizon, a similarly situated co-accused, secured a dismissal, they should be accorded the same relief.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in dismissing the petition of the Banco Filipino officials while granting the petition of their co-accused, Fortunato Dizon, Jr., thereby creating an inconsistent and discriminatory situation.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petitions, reversing the CA decision against the Banco Filipino officials and ordering the dismissal of the criminal cases against them. The legal logic is anchored on the principle of equal protection and the nature of the prosecutor’s discretion. The Court found that the petitioners and Dizon were similarly situated as co-accused based on the same set of facts and evidence. The investigating panel had uniformly recommended dismissal for all accused due to lack of probable cause.
When the Provincial Prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice reversed this uniform recommendation, they exercised prosecutorial discretion. However, the Court of Appeals, in Dizon’s case, found grave abuse of discretion in this reversal, warranting judicial correction. Once the CA ordered the dismissal for Dizon, it established that the continued prosecution of the others lacked a rational basis. To allow prosecution of some while dismissing charges against an identically situated co-accused based on the same operative facts constitutes a denial of equal protection of the law. The State is not permitted to enforce the law with an uneven hand. Consequently, the ruling in favor of Dizon inured to the benefit of all his similarly situated co-accused, necessitating the dismissal of all charges to avoid a discriminatory and oppressive result.