G.R. No. 111426 July 11, 1994
Norma Dizon-Pamintuan, petitioner, vs. People of the Philippines, respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Norma Dizon-Pamintuan was charged with violating the Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. No. 1612). The information alleged that on or about February 12 to 24, 1988, in Manila, she willfully and knowingly bought, kept in her possession, and/or sold jewelry valued at P105,000.00, which she knew or should have known were derived from a robbery committed by Joselito Sacdalan Salinas against spouses Teodoro and Luzviminda Encarnacion. The prosecution evidence established that on February 12, 1988, the Encarnacions’ house was robbed, and jewelry was stolen. Teodoro Encarnacion reported the robbery and provided a list and sketches of the stolen items. On February 24, 1988, based on a tip, police and the Encarnacions went to a stall at Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, tended by the petitioner. The Encarnacions recognized some of their stolen jewelry displayed in the stall’s showcase. The petitioner was invited for investigation, and the jewelry was recovered. The defense, through the testimony of the petitioner’s brother, claimed the stall was owned by a certain “Fredo” and that the police took the jewelry without the petitioner’s consent. The Regional Trial Court convicted the petitioner, applying the disputable presumption of fencing under Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 based on her possession of the stolen items. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but set aside the penalty, ordering the trial court to receive additional evidence on the correct valuation of the jewelry for penalty determination.

ISSUE

The chief issue is the correctness of the Court of Appeals’ decision affirming the conviction but remanding the case for reception of additional evidence on the value of the jewelry to determine the proper penalty.

RULING

The Supreme Court partly granted the petition. It upheld the conviction, finding all elements of fencing proven: (1) a robbery occurred; (2) the petitioner, not a participant in the robbery, possessed and sold the stolen jewelry; (3) she knew or should have known the items were stolen, as presumed under Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 from her mere possession; and (4) she had intent to gain, evidenced by displaying the items for sale. However, the Court modified the penalty. It held that the prosecution failed to prove the exact value of the jewelry with competent evidence beyond reasonable doubt, as required for penalty imposition under Section 3 of P.D. No. 1612. The trial court’s reliance on the victim’s bare testimony and self-serving list was insufficient. Since the exact value was not proven, the penalty should be based on the minimum threshold under the law. The Court set aside the Court of Appeals’ order for remand, ruling it unnecessary and that it would not place the petitioner in double jeopardy. The penalty was reduced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from Ten (10) years and One (1) day of Prision Mayor maximum as minimum to Eighteen (18) years and Five (5) months of Reclusion Temporal maximum as maximum.