G.R. No. 110701 March 12, 2002
Fortune Guarantee and Insurance Corporation, petitioner, vs. Honorable Court of Appeals, Honorable Judge Henedino P. Eduarte, RTC, Branch 20, Cauayan, Isabela, Egdona R. Madriaga, Provincial Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela or any of his deputies and Isabela I Electric Cooperative, Inc., respondents.

FACTS

On November 11, 1988, respondent Isabela I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ISELCO-I) secured a fire insurance policy from petitioner Fortune Guarantee and Insurance Corporation for P2,000,000.00, later amended to include typhoon and flood coverage. During the policy period, ISELCO-I’s insured properties were damaged by two typhoons in 1989. ISELCO-I filed claims, but petitioner refused payment. ISELCO-I filed a complaint for a sum of money. Petitioner claimed the properties were underinsured, as their total value was P36,000,000.00, entitling ISELCO-I only to a fractional payment. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of ISELCO-I, ordering petitioner to pay P2,000,000.00 with interest and attorney’s fees. ISELCO-I filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision and an opposition to the motion for execution. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, and petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. On February 12, 1993, the trial court issued a Special Order granting execution pending appeal, requiring ISELCO-I to post a bond. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed. The motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s Special Order granting execution pending appeal.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition. The Court noted that petitioner adopted the wrong mode of appeal (a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 instead of a petition for review under Rule 45) but addressed the merits in the interest of substantial justice. The Court limited its review to the propriety of the execution pending appeal, refusing to delve into the merits of the main case (the issue of underinsurance), which was the subject of a separate appeal. The Court found that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in granting execution pending appeal. The trial court’s Special Order stated good reasons: the appeal was dilatory, petitioner’s defense was weak, and the bond required would answer for any damages. The determination of good reasons for discretionary execution rests within the trial court’s sound discretion, and its findings are generally not reviewable unless grave abuse is shown, which was not present here. The assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals were affirmed without prejudice to the resolution of the main appeal on its merits.