G.R. No. 110503 August 4, 1994
ANTONIO M. BOLASTIG, petitioner, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Antonio M. Bolastig, the Governor of Samar, was charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act ( Republic Act No. 3019 ) for alleged overpricing in the purchase of office supplies. After his arraignment where he pleaded not guilty, the Special Prosecutor filed a motion for his preventive suspension from office pendente lite, invoking the mandatory provision of Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 .
Petitioner opposed the motion, arguing that preventive suspension should not be a mechanical exercise. He contended the Sandiganbayan must first determine the factual necessity of the suspension, such as whether it was needed to prevent him from influencing witnesses or tampering with records. He also asserted that his suspension would injure not only him but also the electorate of Samar by depriving them of their duly elected governor.

ISSUE

Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the preventive suspension of petitioner pendente lite under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 without a prior factual determination of its necessity.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Court held that under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 , preventive suspension pendente lite is mandatory once a valid information is filed charging a public officer with violations under that law, Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or any offense involving fraud upon government funds or property. The trial court has neither discretion nor duty to conduct a prior factual inquiry into the necessity of the suspension.
The legal logic is clear: the law itself establishes the presumption that unless suspended, the accused public officer may use his office to intimidate witnesses, frustrate prosecution, or commit further malfeasance. This legislative purpose is served by the mandatory suspension. The period of suspension is fixed—it lasts until the case is terminated but not exceeding ninety days—and is not subject to judicial discretion based on an assessment of risk. The Court also rejected the argument concerning deprivation of the electorate’s representation, noting that the Vice-Governor would assume the role, and even the Constitution allows for the suspension of elected officials. Therefore, the Sandiganbayan correctly applied the mandatory statutory command.