GR 110297; (August, 1996) (Digest)
G.R. No. 110297 August 7, 1996
CONSOLACION DE VERA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENJAMIN A.G. VEGA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 39 and QUAYALAY REALTY CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Consolacion de Vera was the tenant of an apartment unit in Manila under a verbal lease agreement originating in 1967, with rentals paid monthly. The original owner sold the property to respondent Quayalay Realty Corporation in 1990. The new owner notified de Vera that her month-to-month lease would not be renewed upon its expiry on December 30, 1990, and subsequently demanded that she vacate the premises. When de Vera refused, Quayalay Realty filed an ejectment case. De Vera contended the lease was for an indefinite period and thus did not expire, rendering the ejectment suit without cause of action. The Metropolitan Trial Court ruled for the lessor, a decision affirmed by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
The core issue is whether the verbal, month-to-month lease contract is a lease with a definite period, the expiration of which constitutes a valid ground for ejectment under the applicable rent control law.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the appellate court’s decision. The Court held that a lease contract where rent is paid monthly is considered under Article 1687 of the Civil Code as a lease with a definite period—from month to month—and is terminable at the end of each month. This provision was not suspended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 877 (the Rent Control Act); only Article 1673, regarding judicial ejectment, was partially suspended. Section 6 of B.P. 877 expressly allows the application of Civil Code provisions not in conflict with the Act. Therefore, Article 1687 remains operative for determining the lease period.
Crucially, the Court clarified that the expiration of a lease period is a ground for ejectment under Section 5(f) of B.P. 877, which applies to both written and oral contracts. The law removed the distinction present in the earlier B.P. Blg. 25, which referred only to “written” contracts. Consequently, with the lease period having expired and proper demand to vacate having been made, the ejectment was justified. The courts did not “fix” the period; they merely applied the legal presumption in Article 1687 based on the monthly rental payments. The new owner was not bound to respect a lease that had already lawfully expired.