GR 108817; (May, 1994) (Digest)
G.R. No. 108817 May 10, 1994
ESPERANZA P. SUMULONG, represented by MARIO P. SUMULONG, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and INLAND TRAILWAYS, INC., respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Esperanza P. Sumulong owned two lots leased to Jopson Management and Development Corporation (Jopson). The lease contract provided for automatic termination upon Jopson’s abandonment of the property. Jopson allegedly abandoned the premises. Private respondent Inland Trailways, Inc. (INLAND) subsequently entered and occupied the lots, claiming an oral sublease from Jopson as part of its purchase of the adjoining Jopson Supermarket. Sumulong filed a complaint for forcible entry in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), alleging INLAND’s entry was by “stealth and strategy” as it had no valid sublease and misrepresented itself as owned by Jopson. The MTC ruled in favor of Sumulong, ordering INLAND to vacate and pay compensation. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the MTC, holding that Sumulong failed to establish prior physical possession, an essential element for forcible entry. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC, ruling that the complaint failed to specifically aver facts constituting forcible entry, as INLAND’s entry appeared to be with Sumulong’s knowledge and acquiescence.
ISSUE
The chief issues are: (1) whether the complaint before the MTC fails to state a cause of action for forcible entry; and (2) assuming it does not, whether it contains sufficient allegations for unlawful detainer for which judgment may be rendered accordingly.
RULING
The Supreme Court granted the petition. It held that the complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action for forcible entry. The allegations that INLAND entered the property “by stealth and strategy” and without a lawful sublease, after Jopson had abandoned the premises, constituted a claim of illegal entry. The Court clarified that prior physical possession, as required in forcible entry, refers to possession prior to the defendant’s entry, not necessarily prior to the filing of the suit. The Court further ruled that even if the facts alleged ultimately support an action for unlawful detainer, a judgment for unlawful detainer may be rendered provided the case was filed within one year from the date of last demand. The Court found that Sumulong made a demand to vacate in December 1989, and the complaint was filed in April 1990, which was within the one-year period. Therefore, the MTC decision was reinstated, subject to the modification that the reasonable compensation for use should commence from December 1989, not June 1989. The decisions of the RTC and the Court of Appeals were set aside.