GR 108738; (June, 1994) (Digest)
G.R. No. 108738 June 17, 1994
ROBERTO CRUZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Roberto Cruz, engaged in the RTW business, borrowed money from businesswoman Andrea Mayor, who was in the business of lending money and rediscounting checks. On March 15, 1989, Cruz borrowed P176,000.00 from Mayor. On April 6, 1989, Mayor delivered the amount to Cruz at his stall, and in turn, Cruz issued Premiere Bank Check No. 057848 postdated April 20, 1989, for the same amount. Upon presentment, the check was dishonored by the drawee bank for reason “account closed.” After being notified of the dishonor and failing to pay, an information for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed against Cruz. During trial, Cruz initially denied issuing the check, knowing Mayor, and having previous transactions with her. However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, he admitted issuing the check but claimed it was issued only as evidence or a memorandum of indebtedness and was not intended for circulation or negotiation.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner Roberto Cruz is liable for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 for issuing a check that was subsequently dishonored, despite his claim that the check was issued merely as evidence of indebtedness and not intended for negotiation.
RULING
Yes, the petitioner is liable. The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts, holding that the issuance of a worthless check is punishable under B.P. 22 regardless of the purpose for which it was issued. The law does not distinguish between checks issued in payment of an obligation and those issued as a guarantee or evidence of debt; the mere act of issuing a bouncing check is malum prohibitum. The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a check knowing at the time of issue that the drawer does not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank, which check is subsequently dishonored. The payee’s knowledge of the drawer’s lack of funds or the check’s restricted nature is immaterial. Furthermore, the petitioner was not permitted to change his theory on appeal from complete denial to admission with a different intent, as this would be unfair and offensive to due process. The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive. The petition was dismissed and the appealed decision affirmed.