GR 108522; (January, 1996) (Digest)
G.R. No. 108522 ; January 29, 1996
GERARDO A. DEL MUNDO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, Presiding Judge of Branch 84, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Metro Manila, DIONISIO PASCUAL, JR., Deputy Sheriff, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, and Spouses CARLOS NAVA and ALEJANDRA NAVA, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Gerardo del Mundo leased a property from spouses Carlos and Alejandra Nava, with an option to purchase. Unable to exercise the option due to lack of funds, del Mundo persuaded the Navas, who were then in the United States, to sign a Deed of Sale with Assignment of Mortgage. He represented this was to facilitate a bank loan to pay for the property. The Navas signed the deed and an addendum assuming del Mundo would pay their existing debts. Del Mundo failed to pay the purchase price or the assumed obligations. Consequently, the Navas executed a Revocation of the Deed of Sale.
The Navas filed an unlawful detainer case to eject del Mundo, which was decided against him. Separately, del Mundo filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief to Quiet Title, asserting ownership based on the notarized Deed of Sale. The trial court dismissed his petition, declared the deed null and void for lack of consideration, and upheld the validity of the revocation. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Del Mundo elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a petition for review.
ISSUE
The primary issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s declaration that the Deed of Sale with Assignment of Mortgage was null and void for lack of consideration.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the appellate court’s decision. The legal logic centers on the substantive requirement of consideration in a contract of sale. A contract of sale is void if the price, which is its essential element, is not paid or at least promised. The Court found that the purported sale was absolutely simulated; the Navas never received any payment from del Mundo for the property. The notarized deed, while a public document, only enjoys the presumption of regularity in its execution, not in the veracity of the statements therein concerning the payment of consideration.
Parol evidence was properly admitted to prove the non-payment of the price, as this fact directly attacked the validity of the contract due to the absence of its essential element. The Navas successfully rebutted the recital of consideration in the deed. Therefore, the contract was correctly declared void ab initio. The Court also reprimanded del Mundo for employing dilatory tactics and warned against future similar conduct.