G.R. No. 107364 February 25, 1999.
SPOUSES FELIPE BUNAG and IRMA BUNAG, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL ROMAN, PEDRO MAGSISI and EMILY HINANG, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondents Pedro Magsisi and Emily Hinang were instituted as tenants on an agricultural land by the owner, Juanita Valdez, in 1964. Their relationship was converted to a leasehold in 1976. On November 4, 1985, petitioners Felipe Bunag and Irma Bunag (the son-in-law and daughter of Juanita Valdez) took over the land. Private respondents filed a complaint to recover possession. On November 15, 1988, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of private respondents, ordering petitioners to reinstate them to the land, pay damages and attorney’s fees, and to vacate the premises. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and became final and executory on May 21, 1990. A writ of execution was issued. Due to petitioners’ refusal to remove their house from the land, private respondents moved for an order of demolition. The RTC granted the motion on June 24, 1991. Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari in the Court of Appeals assailing the demolition order, which was dismissed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

1. Whether petitioners can raise for the first time on appeal the claim that their house is not on the disputed land.
2. Whether the order of demolition varied the final decision which did not expressly order the removal of improvements.
3. Whether the filing of a complaint for eviction against private respondents in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) constitutes a supervening event justifying the recall of the demolition order.

RULING

1. No. An issue not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. This principle applies to special civil actions for certiorari. Petitioners’ counsel was served a copy of the motion for demolition and given notice of the hearing, yet they did not appear or raise the claim that the house was not on the land. They are thus estopped from raising it. Furthermore, in a certiorari proceeding under Rule 65, the inquiry is limited to jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, and questions of fact are not generally permitted.
2. No. The order of demolition did not vary the final decision. A judgment for the delivery or restitution of property is an order to place the prevailing party in possession. If the defendant refuses to surrender possession, the sheriff should oust him; no express order for this is needed in the decision. Rule 39, Sections 13 and 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court provide the procedure: the officer must enforce execution by ousting the person against whom judgment is rendered and placing the judgment creditor in possession. When the property contains improvements by the judgment debtor, the officer shall not remove them except upon special order of the court after due hearing and after the debtor fails to remove them within a reasonable time. Here, petitioners were notified of the motion for demolition, did not oppose it, were given a hearing (which they did not attend), and after the order was issued, were given 15 days to remove the house. There was compliance with the rules.
3. No. The filing of a complaint in the DAR does not constitute a supervening event. A party cannot create an event to excuse noncompliance with a final decision. Notably, the DAR complaint was dismissed on January 13, 1992. Petitioners’ refiling of the complaint appears to be a tactic to delay execution. An order of execution (and an order of demolition issued pursuant to it) is generally not appealable to prevent endless litigation. It cannot be set aside via certiorari except upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion, which was not present here.
The petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.