GR 107271; (September, 2003) (Digest)
G.R. No. 107271 ; September 10, 2003
CITY OF CALOOCAN and NORMA M. ABRACIA, petitioners, vs. HON. MAURO T. ALLARDE, Presiding Judge of Branch 123, RTC of Caloocan City, ALBERTO A. CASTILLO, Deputy Sheriff of Branch 123, RTC of Caloocan City, and DELFINA HERNANDEZ SANTIAGO and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK (PNB), respondents.
FACTS
The case originated from the illegal abolition of the position of Assistant City Administrator of Caloocan City in 1972, which affected respondent Delfina Hernandez Santiago. The Court of First Instance declared the abolition illegal and ordered her reinstatement with back wages. This Court, in a 1985 Resolution in G.R. No. L-39288-89, affirmed that the City’s appeal was frivolous and dilatory, making the judgment final. The City paid Santiago partially but refused full payment. Subsequent writs of execution were issued by the RTC to enforce the final money judgment.
The City persistently resisted execution, filing multiple petitions. In 1992, the sheriff levied and sold a city vehicle at public auction. Petitioners then filed motions to quash the writ and to annul the sale, arguing that municipal properties are exempt from execution. The trial court denied these motions and ordered the levy of three more city vehicles. The City filed the present petition for certiorari, challenging these orders and the auction sale.
ISSUE
Whether the properties of the City of Caloocan are exempt from execution to satisfy a final and executory money judgment.
RULING
The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petition and AFFIRMED the trial court’s orders. The legal logic is clear: the doctrine of non-suability of the state or its political subdivisions is not an absolute bar to execution. While a municipality’s properties devoted to public use are generally exempt from levy, this exemption does not extend to properties that are patrimonial in nature or no longer intended for public service.
In this case, the levied motor vehicles were assigned for the use of the Division of City Schools and other officials. The Court found these vehicles were not exclusively for public use but were available for the personal convenience of the officials, characterizing them as patrimonial property. Consequently, they were subject to execution to satisfy the City’s judgment debt. The Court emphasized that the final judgment had long been settled, and the City’s continued resistance constituted a repudiation of its just obligations. The judicial system must extend its facilities to citizens enforcing valid claims against abusive local government units. The City’s dilatory tactics were condemned, and a warning was issued against further frivolous pleadings.