G.R. No. 104133 , April 18, 1995
Spouses Emilio Abinujar and Milagros M. Lana, petitioners, vs. The Court of Appeals and Spouses Santiago Ramiro and Florentina Ramiro, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners executed a Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase over a house in favor of private respondents. Unable to redeem, petitioners were sued for ejectment. The parties entered into a judicial compromise agreement, approved by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), wherein petitioners agreed to pay specific monetary installments. The agreement stipulated that failure to pay three consecutive installments would entitle respondents to a writ of execution. Petitioners failed to pay the first three installments due on January 31, February 28, and March 31, 1990. They only attempted to pay via postdated checks in August 1990, effectively rescheduling all payments without respondents’ consent.
Respondents moved for execution in the MeTC, which was initially denied. Respondents then successfully petitioned the Regional Trial Court via mandamus to compel the MeTC to issue the writ. The MeTC complied, issuing a writ of execution, and the sheriff served a notice to vacate. Petitioners challenged these actions via certiorari in the Court of Appeals, which dismissed their petition.

ISSUE

Whether the MeTC and RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering and issuing a writ of execution for the enforcement of the judicial compromise agreement.

RULING

No. The courts did not commit grave abuse of discretion. A judicial compromise agreement, once approved by the court, has the force of res judicata and is immediately executory. Under Article 2037 of the Civil Code, its non-fulfillment justifies execution, and the issuance of the writ is a ministerial duty enforceable by mandamus. Petitioners’ clear failure to pay the first three installments as stipulated constituted a breach. Their subsequent tender of postdated checks in August 1990, which unilaterally altered the payment schedule, amounted to an ineffective novation without respondents’ consent. However, the Supreme Court modified the appellate decision regarding the writ’s scope. The obligation under the compromise was purely monetary. Therefore, execution must conform strictly to the judgment. The proper remedy is a writ of execution for a money judgment under Section 15, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, not a writ for the delivery of property under Section 13. The sheriff was thus directed to levy on petitioners’ property to satisfy the monetary judgment, not to enforce possession through ouster. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed with this modification.