G.R. No. 103547 . July 20, 1999.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO MALLARI y SANCHEZ, accused-appellant.

FACTS

Accused-appellant Romeo Mallari y Sanchez was charged with murder for the stabbing death of Alfredo Mendoza on December 9, 1990, in Manila. The prosecution’s eyewitness, Wilfredo Eyas, testified that he, the victim, and Ricardo Borja were having a drinking session when accused-appellant suddenly appeared from behind the seated Mendoza and stabbed him once in the chest before casually walking away and fleeing. Eyas gave chase but retreated when accused-appellant turned to pursue him. The victim died at the hospital. Dr. Marcial Ceñido, the medico-legal officer, confirmed the cause of death and opined that the wound’s position was consistent with an attack by a standing assailant on a seated victim. Accused-appellant was later identified by Eyas in a police line-up. The defense consisted of denial and alibi, with accused-appellant claiming he was at home in Makati during the incident and alleging maltreatment and extortion by the police. The trial court convicted accused-appellant of murder and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE

1. Whether the prosecution’s failure to present Ricardo Borja as a witness constitutes suppression of evidence and a violation of the accused’s right to compulsory process.
2. Whether the trial court erred in giving full faith and credit to the testimony of Wilfredo Eyas, specifically regarding its consistency with medical findings, the presence of treachery, Eyas’s presence at the scene, the lack of proof of ill-motive, and its alleged incredibility and inconsistencies.
3. Whether the guilt of the accused-appellant was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.
1. The prosecution was not guilty of suppression of evidence. The testimony of Borja would have been merely corroborative or cumulative, not material, as the prosecution had satisfactorily established its case through the sole testimony of Eyas. The adverse presumption from suppression of evidence does not apply when the evidence is corroborative or also available to the defense. Borja was available to both parties, and the defense failed to prove the prosecution prevented his testimony. The prosecution has the prerogative to determine which witnesses to present.
2. The trial court did not err in crediting Eyas’s testimony. The medical findings were consistent with Eyas’s account of a sudden attack from behind on a seated victim. Treachery was present as the attack was sudden and from behind, depriving the victim of any chance to defend himself. Eyas’s presence at the scene was established, and the lack of proof of ill-motive on his part was not required as his testimony was clear and credible. The alleged inconsistencies in his testimony were minor and did not affect his credibility. The testimony of a lone eyewitness, if positive and credible, is sufficient for conviction.
3. The guilt of the accused-appellant was proven beyond reasonable doubt based on the positive and credible identification by eyewitness Wilfredo Eyas. The defense of denial and alibi could not prevail over this positive identification.