G.R. Nos. 103446-47, August 30, 1993
Mariano F. Ocampo, IV, petitioner, vs. The Honorable Ombudsman, and The Honorable Sandiganbayan, respondents.

FACTS

Governor Mariano Un Ocampo III and his son, petitioner Mariano F. Ocampo IV, were charged before the Sandiganbayan with two counts of violating Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019 , as amended (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The informations alleged that on September 1, 1988, and August 30, 1988, Governor Ocampo, while serving as Governor of Tarlac and President-Chairman of the Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, Inc. (LTFI), connived with his son to loan amounts of P5,476,031.00 and P7,000,000.00 from the province’s National Aid for Local Government Funds (NALGF) to IMCOR (later New Territory Manufacturing, Inc.), a private corporation where petitioner was an incorporator and stockholder. The loans were allegedly grossly disadvantageous to the government for being interest-free, without collateral, and without a definite repayment date.
After the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner’s motion for reinvestigation, Special Prosecutors Roger C. Berbano, Sr. and Rodolfo F. Reynoso recommended the dismissal of the cases. They found that petitioner did not connive with his father, noting that other IMCOR officers were more directly involved and that petitioner was likely “merely being used by his father… for purposes of registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission.” The Ombudsman, however, disapproved this dismissal recommendation in a memorandum dated November 27, 1991. Petitioner then filed this certiorari petition to annul the Ombudsman’s memorandum, alleging grave abuse of discretion. The Solicitor General, in his comment, sided with the petitioner, stating the evidence was insufficient for a prima facie case. The Ombudsman defended his action as a lawful exercise of his prerogative, having found sufficient evidence to indict.

ISSUE

Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disapproving the special prosecutors’ recommendation to dismiss the criminal informations against the petitioner.

RULING

No, the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The petition is dismissed.
The Supreme Court reiterated the settled rule that criminal prosecutions cannot be restrained through injunction or prohibition, except in specific instances such as when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied. The Court emphasized that it cannot interfere with the Ombudsman’s discretion to determine the specificity and adequacy of the averments of the offense charged. The Ombudsman’s act of disapproving the dismissal recommendation was neither whimsical, capricious, vindictive, nor arbitrary. It was an exercise of his constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutory powers, based on his sincere belief that sufficient evidence existed to indict both accused. The Court must respect this discretion for reasons of practicality and to avoid hampering the functions of the courts with innumerable petitions assailing the Ombudsman’s investigatory decisions.
The Court further clarified that while the Ombudsman has full discretion to determine whether to file a criminal case, once the case is filed with the Sandiganbayan, it is that court—and no longer the Ombudsman—which assumes full control, and any dismissal of the informations requires the Sandiganbayan’s approval.