G.R. No. 102942 , April 18, 1997
Amado F. Cabaero and Carmen C. Perez, Petitioners, vs. Hon. Alfredo C. Cantos, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. VII, and Epifanio Ceralde, Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Amado Cabaero and Carmen Perez were accused of estafa in Criminal Case No. 18826. In their answer, they interposed a counterclaim for damages against the private complainant, Epifanio Ceralde, alleging malicious prosecution. The trial court granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss this counterclaim. Petitioners elevated the matter, arguing their counterclaim was compulsory and would be deemed waived if not raised in the criminal case, as the civil liability from the crime was impliedly instituted therein.
The majority opinion, to resolve the procedural impasse and prevent further delay of the criminal trial, ordered the civil aspect to be reserved for separate determination, effectively deconsolidating it from the criminal action. Justice Regalado, in this separate concurring opinion, agrees with this practical solution but provides a distinct legal rationale for dismissing the counterclaim.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court correctly dismissed the petitioners’ counterclaim for damages based on alleged malicious prosecution filed within the criminal case for estafa.

RULING

Yes, the trial court correctly dismissed the counterclaim, but on grounds different from those it cited. Justice Regalado concurs in the result, approving the reservation of the civil action, but clarifies that the counterclaim was properly dismissible because it was premature and not grounded on a complete cause of action. A counterclaim, like a complaint, must be based on a valid and enforceable cause of action at the time of filing the answer.
The claim for damages was founded on malicious prosecution (denuncia falsa). Established jurisprudence, from U.S. vs. Rubal to more recent cases like Lao vs. Court of Appeals, requires that for such an action to prosper, the criminal case allegedly filed maliciously must have been terminated with a final judgment of acquittal or dismissal. Here, the estafa case was still pending determination. Thus, the petitioners’ cause of action for malicious prosecution had not yet accrued; it was contingent on the outcome of the very case in which they filed the counterclaim. Their claim was therefore premature. Consequently, the trial court could and should have dismissed the counterclaim without prejudice to its refiling in a separate civil action once all conditions, including a final favorable termination of the criminal case, are met. This rationale supports the majority’s directive to proceed with the criminal case independently.