G.R. No. 102432 January 21, 1993
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE RICARDO P. PRESBITERO, SR., represented by its Administrator, RICARDO PRESBITERO, JR., petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and LEONARDO CAÑOSO, respondents.

FACTS

On August 19, 1981, Ricardo Presbitero, Sr. entered into two contracts with Leonardo Cañoso. The first, a “Conformity of Agreement,” retained Cañoso’s services to negotiate with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and the Ministry of Agrarian Reform for the sale of Hacienda Maria under Operation Land Transfer, with a 120-day period for processing documents. The second, a “Contract of Service,” bound Presbitero to compensate Cañoso with 25% of the gross total sales from the land transfer. This fee was later reduced to 17.5% in a third agreement. After the LBP claim was approved, Presbitero sent letters to LBP requesting the release of Cañoso’s share but failed to give it. Cañoso filed a complaint. During trial, several postponements were granted. A hearing set for July 1, 1987, was moved to August 31 and September 1-3, 1987, by agreement. Presbitero’s counsel sent a telegram on September 1, 1987, seeking another postponement due to financial handicap. The trial court denied the motion, noting the rules do not recognize financial handicap as a ground and that Presbitero had local counsel. The court allowed Cañoso to present evidence ex-parte. The trial court rendered a decision ordering Presbitero to pay Cañoso 25% of the collectible from LBP, plus attorney’s fees and damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision, reducing the award to 17.5%. Presbitero died during the appeal, and his estate filed the petition for review.

ISSUE

1. Whether the trial court committed a denial of due process by allowing ex-parte presentation of evidence and denying Presbitero’s motion for postponement.
2. Whether the respondent Court of Appeals erred in finding that Cañoso complied with the terms and conditions of the contract.

RULING

1. No, there was no denial of due process. The trial court’s denial of the motion for postponement was proper. The reason given—financial handicap—is not a valid ground for postponement under the Rules of Court. Presbitero was represented by two lawyers, one of whom was a local resident, and he had been granted several prior postponements. The court’s order allowing ex-parte presentation was later reconsidered, and Presbitero was given the opportunity to present his evidence. Therefore, he was not deprived of his day in court.
2. No, the Court of Appeals did not err. The contracts between the parties were valid and binding. The reduction of the fee from 25% to 17.5% was established. Presbitero’s subsequent letters to LBP, requesting the release of Cañoso’s 17.5% share, constituted a ratification of the contract and an admission of Cañoso’s services. The stipulation of a 120-day period was not a condition precedent but a mere estimate of time for processing, and Cañoso substantially performed his obligations. The principle of promissory estoppel applies, as Presbitero’s letters induced Cañoso to believe he would be paid. The Court of Appeals correctly modified the award to 17.5% in accordance with the parties’ subsequent agreement. The petition was denied, and the decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.