GR 100456 59; (September, 1993) (Digest)
G.R. Nos. 100456-59 September 10, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CELSO AMADOR, RESTY AMADOR and FELIPE ROBLES, accused. CELSO AMADOR, appellant.
FACTS
Accused Celso Amador, Resty Amador, and Felipe Robles were charged in four separate Informations for Frustrated Murder (Criminal Case No. 6764), Destructive Arson of Jorge Irader’s house (Criminal Case No. 6765), Destructive Arson of Teofilo Bancairen’s house (Criminal Case No. 6766), and Murder (Criminal Case No. 6776), all allegedly committed on January 8, 1987. After a joint trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Resty Amador of Frustrated Murder and Murder, and all three accused of two counts of Destructive Arson. Celso Amador and Felipe Robles were acquitted of the Frustrated Murder and Murder charges. Celso Amador appealed his conviction for arson. The prosecution’s evidence for the arson charges established that on the night of January 8, 1987, prosecution witnesses Rodrigo Revillo and Orestes Fernando saw Celso Amador, along with his co-accused, setting fire to the houses of Teofilo Bancairen and Jorge Irader. Celso Amador interposed the defense of alibi, claiming he was at home at the time of the incidents.
ISSUE
The main issues raised by appellant Celso Amador were: (1) the credibility of prosecution witnesses Rodrigo Revillo and Orestes Fernando; (2) the correctness of his positive identification by said witnesses; (3) the existence of conspiracy among the accused; and (4) the alleged erroneous reliance by the trial court on his defense of alibi as a ground for conviction.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, convicting Celso Amador of two counts of Destructive Arson. The Court held that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Revillo and Fernando were credible and sufficient to establish appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The witnesses positively identified appellant, whom they had known for some time, from distances of 20 and 30 meters, with sufficient illumination provided by a gas lamp, the moon, and the burning houses. The Court found appellant’s defense of alibi weak and unavailing, as it was not physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene given that his house was only about 2 kilometers away, and such defense cannot prevail over positive identification. The Court also clarified that the trial court did not base the arson conviction on a finding of conspiracy but on evidence that each accused, including appellant, directly participated in the overt acts of setting the houses on fire. The acquittal in the murder and frustrated murder cases was due to insufficient evidence of participation in those specific crimes and did not validate his alibi for the arson charges.
