G.R. No. 100285 August 13, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NAPOLEON DUQUE, accused-appellant.

FACTS

Accused-appellant Napoleon Duque was charged with and convicted of illegal recruitment in large scale under Article 38 in relation to Article 39 of the Labor Code. The information alleged that in January 1986, in Calamba, Laguna, Duque, without the necessary license or authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), willfully and unlawfully recruited Glicerio Teodoro, Agustin Ulat, Ernesto Maunahan, Norma Francisco, Elmo Alcaraz, and Marcelino Desepida for work abroad, exacting and receiving money from them. The prosecution witnesses testified that Duque invited them to his house, presented himself as a licensed recruiter for Saudi Arabia, asked them to prepare documents and placement fees, and collected money from them (Ulat: P20,000; Alcaraz: P5,000; Desepida: P7,000; Francisco: P9,000) without issuing receipts. Duque failed to deploy them abroad and did not return their money. A POEA certification confirmed Duque had no license or authority to recruit. The trial court convicted Duque and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, a fine of P100,000, and indemnification of the complainants.

ISSUE

Whether the criminal offense of illegal recruitment had prescribed at the time the information was filed.

RULING

No, the offense had not prescribed. The crime of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code prescribes in three years pursuant to its Article 290. The mode of computation is governed by Act No. 3326 , as amended. Under Section 2 of Act No. 3326 , prescription begins to run from the day of the commission of the violation if known at the time, or if not known, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings. Illegal recruitment has two elements: (1) recruitment activities, and (2) lack of the necessary POEA license or authority. While the recruitment acts and collection of money occurred in January 1986, the lack of authority—an essential element making the act criminal—was not known to the complainants at that time. They discovered this lack of authority only when they went to the POEA to file a complaint. The three-year prescriptive period, therefore, began to run only from the time of such discovery, not from the date of payment. The information filed on May 22, 1990, was thus timely. The Court affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty to life imprisonment, as the crime is punishable under a special law, not the Revised Penal Code, and the proper nomenclature for the penalty is life imprisonment, not reclusion perpetua.