G.R. No. and Date: G.R. No. L-10181, March 21, 1914
Case Title: In the matter of the investigation of certain charges preferred by Severino Caoibes against LUCIANO DE LA ROSA, attorney and counselor at law.

FACTS:
Severino Caoibes filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Luciano de la Rosa, alleging three charges: (1) that De la Rosa, in collusion with his client Juliana Bayubay y Garcia, withheld payment of the balance of the purchase price for a parcel of land Caoibes sold to Bayubay, causing him damage; (2) that De la Rosa maliciously obstructed Caoibes from collecting the debt, forcing Caoibes to pay him P900 to allow the payments to proceed; and (3) that De la Rosa refused to turn over P1,330 of the purchase price remaining in his possession.

The evidence showed that Caoibes sold a parcel of land to Bayubay for P15,500. After an initial payment, a balance of P5,330 remained. Bayubay later discovered the land’s area was significantly less than what was stated in the deed. De la Rosa, as Bayubay’s attorney, advised her on the possibility of seeking a price reduction. Caoibes then approached De la Rosa to intercede with Bayubay to secure payment of the full balance. De la Rosa agreed to do so for a fee of P1,000 from Caoibes, ultimately collecting P900. Bayubay, with De la Rosa’s knowledge, made the payments to Caoibes, leaving a balance of P330 still with her, not with De la Rosa.

ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Luciano de la Rosa committed malpractice or conduct warranting disciplinary action by representing both the vendor (Caoibes) and the purchaser (Bayubay) in the same transaction and collecting a fee from Caoibes while being the attorney of record for Bayubay.

RULING:
The Court dismissed the complaint. It found the first and third charges unsubstantiated by evidence. Regarding the second charge, the Court held that while De la Rosa’s conduct did not constitute legal malpractice under the Code of Civil Procedure, as both parties knowingly consented to his dual representation, such practice is “severely to be condemned.” The Court emphasized that an attorney cannot serve two masters with opposing interests, as it undermines the fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship and is dangerous in its possibilities. The practice was strongly discouraged, but under the specific circumstanceswith full knowledge and consent of both partiesit did not rise to the level of a disciplinary offense warranting sanction. The proceedings were dismissed.