G.R. No. B.M. No. 1370 ; May 9, 2005
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES

FACTS

Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., admitted to the Bar in 1961, requested exemption from paying his Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues amounting to P12,035.00 for 1977-2005. He argued that he should not be assessed dues for the period he was in the Philippine Civil Service (1962-1986), as civil service law prohibited the practice of his profession, nor for the years he worked in the United States (1986-2003). He contended that compulsory payment from an inactive, non-practicing lawyer without income from law practice was oppressive and violated constitutional due process and equal protection.
The IBP, in its comment, opposed the request. It emphasized that membership and the concomitant obligation to pay annual dues are compulsory for all lawyers listed in the Roll of Attorneys, regardless of active practice. The IBP cited Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, noting the Supreme Court has upheld dues as necessary to defray the costs of the integrated bar program. It stated the Board of Governors maintained a policy of no exemption, though it was discussing proposals to create an “inactive status” category.

ISSUE

Whether or not a lawyer who was inactive in the practice of law, due to government service and work abroad, is entitled to exemption from the payment of mandatory IBP annual membership dues.

RULING

The Supreme Court DENIED the petition and ordered Atty. Arevalo to pay the assessed dues. The Court ruled that payment of annual dues is a non-waivable condition of membership in the integrated bar. The IBP is a state-organized, unified bar to which every lawyer must belong as a condition for the retention of one’s name in the Roll of Attorneys and the privilege to practice law. Integration is a regulatory measure exercised under the Court’s constitutional power to regulate the legal profession.
The obligation to pay dues is intrinsic to this integration and is not a tax but a regulatory exaction to fund the Bar’s programs. The compulsion is justified by the state’s legitimate interest in elevating professional standards, with the cost shared by all lawyers as beneficiaries of the regulatory system. Inactivity in practice does not sever membership or its financial obligations. The practice of law is a privilege, not a property right, and is subject to the Court’s inherent regulatory power, including the imposition of membership fees. Failure to pay dues validly warrants administrative penalties, including suspension from practice. The Court found no constitutional infirmity, as the uniform imposition of dues is a reasonable exercise of police power and the judicial prerogative to regulate the bar.