G.R. No. A.M. No. RTJ-99-1486. June 26, 2001.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. JUDGE ISMAEL SANCHEZ y BALAIS, Regional Trial Court, Lucena City, respondent.

FACTS

An anonymous letter from a “Group to Clean the Judiciary of Lucena City” informed the Chief Justice that respondent Judge Ismael B. Sanchez was using a car involved in a carnapping case pending in his sala, Criminal Case No. 96-460 (People vs. SPO4 Rim Mulbog). The car, a Toyota Corolla, was ordered provisionally dismissed on October 28, 1996, with an order for the vehicle to be delivered to the Chief of Police of Lucena City for safekeeping. An office order dated November 27, 1996, authorized process server Jose D. Lopez to receive the car from the PNP for delivery to the police. However, the car was not delivered to the police. A discreet inquiry by Justice Narciso T. Atienza (Ret.) for the Office of the Court Administrator revealed that the car was never turned over to the Chief of Police and was instead in the possession of Judge Sanchez since October 1998, having been brought to his residence in Pasig. Judge Sanchez admitted during a preliminary conference that the vehicle had been in his custody and possession since December 1997. He issued an order on December 6, 1996, transferring custody of the car to the court instead of the Chief of Police. He claimed the car was used for official court business after being repaired.

ISSUE

Whether Judge Ismael B. Sanchez is administratively liable for misconduct for taking custody and using for his personal benefit a carnapped vehicle which was the subject of a provisionally dismissed case in his court.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court found Judge Sanchez guilty of gross misconduct and ordered his DISMISSAL from service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any government branch or instrumentality. The Court held that a judge is the visible representation of law and justice and must observe the law scrupulously. Judge Sanchez’s act of issuing an order transferring the custody of the carnapped vehicle to his court and then taking possession of it for his personal use constituted a criminal violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act. His claim of official use was untenable as the vehicle was not officially assigned to him, and his possession deprived the lawful owner of its recovery. His actions exhibited dishonesty and gross misconduct, violating the Code of Judicial Conduct which requires judges to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety. Such conduct eroded public confidence in the judiciary and warranted the severest penalty.